BRAZIL Ports V - Possible Most Competitive complexes in 2040

BRAZIL Ports V - Possible Most Competitive complexes in 2035-2040 (based on my data plus PORTER plus SWOT after the recent crises) AND AFTER CHINA/BRICS/TRUMP various tariff blocks = 50% against BRAZIL

A) INTRODUCTION – (article with 20 pg without Summary because its only to research and/or to consult and/or to project)

 Based on my studies in Portuguese and English, including the fact that with 08 new giant, broad-gauge railways under construction in a cross shape, Brazilian exports could double by 2040 and triple by 2060, with already 18 thousand external access points (also based on meeting 08 pre-selected fundamental criteria well to serve - see the reasons and much more details only in the complete study) here I score, classify and name, with a horizon of 2035-2040, the 13 best future ports in Brazil, some still to be built and others to be dynamized. Other threats or opportunities are that China is investing heavily in its so-called Silk Road and in large industries in the Gulf of Aden, at the end of the Suez Canal, especially in TEDA – The Tianjin Suez Canal Economic and Technological Development Trade and Economic Cooperation Zone, also known as the “China-Egypt Industrial Park”. In May 2025, also, the Chinese government also declared that it will support the Transoceanic Railway, starting in our Ilhéus-BA Port, as it sees it as a great alternative via the Suez Canal, to the current Panama Canal.

 I also urge investors, owners, partners, managers and technicians of our large mining companies and their dependent railways and ports, etc. no longer prioritize only large-scale mineral exploration and shipments (see mistakes in Brumadinho City iron mine and Mariana City iron mine, but it seems that VALE's directors have not learned anything yet, since they may still be making the same mistakes - the possible recent blockade of the Port of Ilhéus and its FIOL rail, which China supports). Also, local bodies and directors need to be aware of whether the purchasing/processing companies are really exporting/selling them via the route that best pays rural producers/miners/local workers, which develops the most.

 In my humble opinion and knowledge, there are 6 future priorities to increase our port-railway competitiveness by 2035-2040: 1) To prioritize broad-gauge or mixed railways that reach minimum speeds of 80 km/hour, including mandatory passenger transport; 2) Same, of “off-shore” ports for loading/unloading of up to 200 thousand tons. or 18,000 containers, thus, practically, without requiring constant dredging that leads to shameful, expensive and very polluting giant queues of trucks and ships; 3) Same as building new Ports with 3,000 linear meters of real berthing areas (sum of 10 large ships) PLUS, at least, 5,000 m2 of retroport concentration areas; 4) Same as to prioritize new ports plus their railroads in locations with current and/or future medium to large industries, as long as they are competitively located at most 1,000 km from it; 5) Same as in locations with current and/or future large mineral deposits or similar, to export/import/employ much more, as long as they are competitively located at most 1,500 km from such Port; 6) To prioritize ports with their railways accessing current or future large grain, food, bioenergy, etc. production, as long as they are competitively located no more than 2,000 km from such port (see the reasons and much more details in the complete study).

 B) WORLD/CHINA-BRAZIL-PERU FUTURE (2040) PORTS/RAIWAYL/ROADS DEMANDS - HISTORY, CURRENT SITUATION AND  GENERAL TRENDS –

 In an attempt to carry out such a difficult, simple comparative and ranking - proposed to be annual, still only estimated and only personal - of possible future Brazilian port competitiveness (just to fill in gaps that are nonexistent and even very difficult to carry out/interpret, I based myself on only 08 variables that are most used at the moment, but that should reach 12, in a possible more academic and more strategic future government classification, but...). This also occurs even though the author knows, fundamentally, about 80% of the interior of Brazil, plus his 14 published books, with up to 750 pages, between 2000-2004, about the main agro chains plus their complete future logistics; also predicted future supplies/demands; technologies; hedging and even speculative operations on world stock exchanges, etc. In addition, the same author also already has 12 patent applications in progress on new sustainable energies plus a future self-rechargeable electric vehicle that is 100% unplugged, etc. (driven by up to 07-10 totally sustainable internal natural forces) and with companies from Brazil, if possible, to research/develop/add and conclude, quickly, etc., in fact, as the large EV manufacturers already do, still in isolation, with their multiple secrets and strategies, already with up to 3-4 sources of those I propose, but which have not yet managed to add them, internally in a single future EV (see my recent demonstrative article/pdf about it in Portuguese and English on LinkedIn).

 I clarify, as a duty and as a matter of merit, that such FUTURE analyses and scores, predicted/projected below, were carried out based on the 04 “SWOT” forces (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats), which are configured as a fundamental tool to properly analyze each business and/or each project or investor/financier interest, considering internal factors (strengths and weaknesses) and external factors (opportunities and threats), already active and/or tending to, today. I also based myself heavily on Porter's 05 competitive forces: a) Competitive rivalries of sellers (“seller”); b) Difficulties created/imposed for the entry of new buyers/competitors by monopolies and oligopolies (“buyers”); c) Bargaining powers/substitutions by the new entrant/new product (“replacement”); d) Law of supply “versus” Law of demand (“conflict”) and 5) Real negotiating power of “oneself” and suppliers in the supply chain/competitors (“new entry”), all created/well outlined by the fantastic North American guru Prof. Michael Porter (still alive; Professor at Harvard Business School and scholar in the areas of Administration and Economics and one of the main references in the field of global business management).

 In December/2024, I wrote on the 04 websites that I always publish and already with 1.2 million views of 295 articles/diagnoses (02 sites in Brazil more 02 in the USA, linked to the Harvard Group), 02 challenging articles, in Portuguese and in English, with unprecedented and well-founded technical-marketing prospects and forecasts, in which I predict that Brazilian exports will increase 100% (doubling) by 2040 and/or 200% (tripling) by 2060, all thanks to the 08 new fast, cross-country and broad-gauge railways, already being completed and/or under construction, quite fast, in Brazil. Obviously, few ports in Brazil will be able to expand their services so much by those years, since there is already a high concentration and even some stagnation/overuse/obsolescence/reduction in competitiveness of some shallow ports in the Southeast and South Regions of the country. In that article, I also indicated in same article the 09 main strategic points where these railroads cross and where, certainly, large manufacturing enterprises and their internal and external investments will be installed. To my surprise, the readings, especially abroad – were and are records in the last 05 months and even much higher than the official documents promoting the Ministries responsible for this in Brasília Capital - DF. See it in English and already with 11,017 page-views at: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/brazil-how-08-new-fast-broad-gauge-railways-can-double-cezar-m7zif/?trackingId=PluMwFn7QTevA%2FKrIBgsCQ%3D%3D  (“Brazil - About how 08 new fast and broad-gauge railways can double our exports by 2040 and triple by 2060”); IDEM in Portuguese and already with 16,939 page views at: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/brasil-sobre-como-08-novas-ferrovias-r%C3%A1pidas-e-em-bitola-cezar-ua95f/  (Brazil - About how 08 new fast and broad gauge railways can double our exports by 2040 and triple by 2060).

 Basically, in my humble opinion, this current, real and intense fight over the discussed effectiveness and/or large profit generation between the main modes of shipment, disembarkation and transportation in the world today, only reflects the fights over 03 essential demands of humans since the caves, 02 of which are very polluting: 1) Housing and Well-Being - which are obtained through the expensive and very polluting processing of mineral products, prioritizing much more the railways, which are known to be less polluting; 2) Transportation and Migration and their auxiliary personal/group/family ambitions - both coming from/dependent on the highly polluting oil industries and the highways and vehicle factories, which depend on them; 3) Healthier, more nutritious and reproductive food and Heating - these are little or almost not polluting and which can be obtained regionally without depending on the 02 previous polluting actions. CONCLUSION: Most of the current and future gigantic socio-environmental problems arise from eternal dissatisfaction and high economic and financial ambitions of humans, who therefore prefer to migrate and even to steal/damage everything to satisfy them and/or discover something new, even if it means destroying everything and everyone around them, leaving a clear trail of destruction and human/animal/biota deaths for everyone to later take care of/share the costs of. This is also why we have to fight hard for forms of transportation and electricity generation that satisfy the three demands above, but as long as they are much less polluting.

 To this end, I base myself heavily on my frequent previous in edits and strategic diagnoses/articles, in Portuguese and English PLUS in this recent new very difficult world phase - due to the many recent trade blockades; China's effects/retaliations; BRICs' actions and intentions; attempts to abandon the US$ exchange/exporter; Trump Effect etc. in which, based on the partial or already full fulfillment of 08 pre-selected very modern and fundamental requirements etc. (see the reasons and much more details only in the complete study), I built and here I score, classify and nominate - see simple classification well outlined/not detailed here for 2035-2040 below - the 13 best future ports in Brazil, some still to be built/dynamized/remodeled/updated by 2040. The complete diagnosis - detailed/scored port-by-port plus its dependent/auxiliary railways etc. can be obtained by email: [email protected].  Other real threats or opportunities – although little known and still not accepted in Brazil – are that China has been investing heavily in its so-called Silk Road since 2013, as well as in large industries and processing plants at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden at the tip of the Suez Canal, as they want – cleverly – to also serve and sell well throughout West and Southeast Asia and not just inland China. In the Aden region, TEDA – the Tianjin Suez Canal Economic and Technological Development Trade and Economic Cooperation Zone, also known as the “China-Egypt Industrial Park”, is already very active. This industrial park is a project of China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”, which aims to develop economic and commercial partnerships with countries along the route of the ancient Silk Road, that is, with many more and new challenges that are still little known and not even accepted by Brazilian businesspeople and government officials.

 I also insist a lot on our fundamental and new railway logistics - much more on the already fundamental broad gauge - PLUS semi-deep port (actual draft at the boarding/disembarking point above 15 m deep) and super-deep (above 18 m deep) - because BOTH are truly revolutionary, very developmental and fast. I also fight - alone - and with many numbers, data and serious technical-scientific arguments (many external and even internal) the unreliable - opposing lobbies plus their many weekly "fake news" plus their misleading and/or even paid propaganda against them. Everything happens, and may even be paid for, by giant global interests/countries/states and perhaps even with Brazilian support, lying and contrary to the Northeast and North Ports/Rails and, above all, by the many internal lobbies against, including purchases - corporate/perhaps even governmental - of many paid reports, lying and without any minimum credible basis (= paid fake news) in the specialized and/or generalized press, all of which are not very nationalistic.

 First of all, I sincerely understand that – for the sake of the future of the entire country and its people – investors, owners, partners, managers and technicians of our large mining companies and their dependent railroads and ports can no longer interfere/avoid their high socioeconomic and environmental responsibilities, all by prioritizing only large-scale explorations and mineral shipments, etc. and always only after much greater profits, facilities, incentives and large bonuses for managers/employees, etc. Such items are known to be fundamental to making such exports viable, and above all, their total transportation, but it is also understood that some poorly conducted/poorly monitored explorations (facts that are even recurrent in Brazil) even destroy a lot of soil, subsoil, water and biota and, much worse, have low added value in exports/domestic sales; they to employ and to develop their exploration and transportation sites much less. On the contrary, such companies need much more to collect, to transport and to export/import in modern railway compositions - already in wide and even mixed gauges - much more industrialized products and other highly exportable/importable items, all as large local value aggregators and many more employers and developers in the interior and along ports, the same for mandatory passenger transport. The fundamental development of our many still poor regions in most of the inland states, and even on the coast (even to greatly increase the total demands and even the items of such companies in question/argument) they cannot remain, forever, dependent on such decision-makers and even on their many socio-environmental errors and selfish investments by these mining/transportation companies and/or by their directors, technicians and even their investors, all of whom are well aware of the unquestionable, very expensive and very serious previous errors of such decisions, as occurred recently in Brumadinho City ore mine - MG and in Mariana City ore mine - MG, greatly damaging the images and the socio-environmental corporate balance sheets of such miners, to date.

 Defending expensive, outdated, slow, dangerous and already inefficient ports and railways (in an attempt to compete with those of China and India, for example) PLUS to transport/export/deliver only minerals and other very bulky items PLUS just to further enrich the few families in the world that own them and their investors and even their directors, etc., by 2040, could be considered a major ongoing socioeconomic crime against people, animals, biotas, soils, subsoils, waters, air, etc. And, worse, against the harmonious and fair development of countries and people. In today's world, a few very ambitious/shrewish/destructive families, better known as HNWI “High-Net Worth Individuals”, own most of the groups/businesses and already have the combined world wealth of Us $ 86.8 trillion (3 times greater than the US GDP of Us $ 27.4 trillion). On the other hand, several of my other serious diagnoses have already to proven that Brazilian farmers only keep 8.0% to 14.0% of the final gross revenues from most rural activities (see my articles on this). Thus, the daily struggles of rural producers/miners/extractives etc. are very arduous and difficult and they do not have time to properly follow all the nuances and daily global changes in such pricing, exchanges and, perhaps, cleverness.

 Also, unfortunately, I must issue a serious warning here to the mining companies, their technicians and their investors, who, in their eagerness to generate profits – increasingly greater and selfish – practically to demand that the Ports and their railways or highways, attached and/or their fundamental parts, to dedicate themselves only to the collection, transportation and export of iron and similar minerals – obviously, essential items to keep such modes operating –, but few generators of jobs, foreign exchange and, above all, real developments (since most of them even to degrade the environment a lot in their extractions, as recognized by all, as seen in the two recent gigantic socio-environmental disasters above). They, in personal and unpatriotic terms, have to think, at least a little, about the fundamental transportation of passengers and, mainly, of industrial and/or similar items with high added value/industrialization, these, yes, great generators of jobs, income, taxes, developments, etc. Defending only expensive Ports and Railways just to export minerals and other items that are only very bulky can be a great crime against people, the environment, developments and Brazil assets, which are necessary and harmonious.

 On the other hand, unfortunately, such diagnosis also clearly shows that many Brazil regional Cooperatives, Unions and Associations of rural producers and owners of mineral deposits, biofuels, Mayors, Secretaries, Councilors, Members of Service Clubs, Store Directors, “S” System, Professors/Directors/Rectors of Public Universities, Government Managers, etc., have to be much more attentive and to fight much more for the interests of their associates/cooperatives/farmers/miners/workers, etc., since, perhaps, some traders and buyers/processors of grains/food, biofuels/minerals, etc., may be choosing not only the worst mode, but also the longest route for outflow/purchases (which can be proven here in some cases). They also have a major impact on the much higher costs of transporting their production, which certainly increases all their production costs and/or greatly reduces the prices received by local farmers, as well as their income and jobs generated, and/or greatly worsens their exchange ratios for their inputs, especially fertilizers, agrochemicals, machinery, fuels, etc. In other words, rural properties, municipalities, regions and states develop very little when this occurs and/or do so very slowly, painfully and in a socially and environmentally unfair way. Therefore, it is essential and necessary to closely monitor and to study all of this, daily and locally. In other words, it is necessary to be very attentive and to do everything possible to properly serve/guide these rural producers and others so that they are not harmed, and everything possible so that they do not help to increase, unknowingly/unwillingly/unwillingly, the already very high profits of some companies – many of which are foreign – and of their shareholders and investors.

 Regarding the main current and future transportation modes, and for the more attentive/interested readers and analysts, I inform that there are some global diagnoses - serious and by renowned consultants/professors -, proving that large railways and large ports are only viable when they transport items in constant and large volumes and even with low added value (that is, with huge offers even daily and/or guaranteed for long terms), even if they are cheaper and with maritime transportation, naturally, much slower and cheaper (such as minerals, forestry products, etc., except building materials) and/or with high added industrial/agroindustrial/food/bioenergy value, as long as they are neighbors within 2,000 km of such ports and always via railways (otherwise it is much better to process and/or to use/sell regionally, according to several pieces of evidence in this regard).

 Recently, in May 2025, during the Presidential trip to China, the current Federal Government announced several huge Chinese investments in Brazil, as well as other fundamental, urgent and excellent port-railway measures for the whole of Brazil (not just only for the Southeast and South Regions, as is common and always with them – with intense hunger – putting a lot of pressure/lobbying for this). First, the Presidency of the BRICs Bank (headquartered in Shanghai) announced that the Chinese President accepted and agreed to complete the long-awaited and long-planned Transoceanic Railway for 30 years if it comes from future Ilhéus Port. This is our future giant transoceanic railway (4,900 km in total to Peru), highly strategic and decisive for many more foreign and domestic private investors; comprehensive/extensive and, therefore, highly beneficial to the interior; not very well-paved (through long and consecutive plains and plateaus) and crossing huge mineral and agricultural areas of 05 central states (BA, GO, MT, RO and AC).

 The sea distance between the Port of Chancay (Peru) and the Port of Shanghai (China) is approximately 20,700 (11,200 nautical miles), according to the Chinese company Cosco Shipping, taking into account conventional maritime transport routes. Cosco Shipping, as the parent company of the Port of Chancay in Peru, is involved in long-distance voyages between the ports. So, from the Peruvian Port of Chancay to the many ports in Eastern China is almost 2,875 km less (20,475 km - 17,600 km) and still in half the total journey time, as already proven by the recent Cosco -, than going via Tubarão Port, Santos Port or Paranaguá Port and others to the same Chinese ports, but passing through the old and almost unique route through southern Africa.

 Furthermore, it is always good to insist that, optionally, to access the deep port of the Brazilian VALE miner and partners in Bayovar/Piura (closer giant  phosphate fertilizer mine belonging to VALE more Mitusi and Mosaic) in northern Peru – about 1,070 km closer to China (by sea westward across by the Pacific Ocean) since Peru is almost a descending triangle through South America – coming from Brazil (passing and developing very poor areas in the north and northwest of AC) there are no major problems with many tunnels to cross the Andes, since in the Pucallpa Region - Peru (only about 300 km away from Cruzeiro do Sul - AC, it is in the Rondon Quadrant and on Route 3 of the “Envira Valley”) there is the “Desfiladeiro da Esperança” (the famous “Hope Canyon”) with a fairly wide valley and through which a highway passes to the center and the much deeper ports of northern Peru (Piura region), via the beginning of the Ucayali River (a large tributary of our current Amazon River) and passing the large city of Tarapolo/Tarapoto, which is simply 2,000 m deep (that is, to reduce all this into a future railway/highway) and through which, long before, the Amazon River passed.

As a future rail/port option (much more beneficial for very poor and abandoned areas throughout Acre and all of Central-Western-Northern Brazil), the future Chinese bioceanic railway—without passing through Pucallpa and the very distant Cusco—could go directly up, in a 300 km shorter route, crossing far fewer rivers (the largest is the Ucayalli) and without expensive tunnels (since it already skirts the Andes to the north) from Cruzeiro do Sul, AC, to the medium-sized Peruvian city of Jaen (via Tarapoto more Yurimaquas – peruvian cities), only 930 km away (from Cruzeiro do Sul), but passing through closed and much flatter areas of the forest (this was the preferred plan of the former IIRSA). The Peruvian city of Jaen is 750 km above sea level, and by climbing only to 2,350 m – see traffic road at youtube movie below (there is already a good highway), the entire northern Andes can be easily and much more cheaply crossed. The best thing is that Jaen is only about 330 km from the deep port of Bayovar - Peru (this one 430 km closer to China than Chancay), which already belongs to the new VALE and partners and which have a giant mine of phosphate fertilizers there and which could very well supply and greatly reduce the costs of a good part of the agriculture in the Brazilian center-west.

So, proving all this that I state here, recently, the Chinese giant Cosco Navigation – which set up the new semi-deep port of Chancay/Lima in Peru for US $ 3.5 billion – also stated that to make it fully viable – including reducing the total navigation time to China by 10 days, given the current slow route, via southern Africa, it depended almost entirely on minerals, grains, food and bioenergy that would have to arrive from Brazil, via the future fast Transoceanic Railway/FICO/FIOL (in total to be supplemented/finalized budgeted at another R$ 55.0 billion = approximately US $ 10.0 billion comes from Lucas do Rio Verde – MT, already as the future Transoceanic Railway and with approximately another 2,900 km to the Port of Peru (in other words, very little for those Chinese), but already 39% in verifiable works and crossing the entire interior of Brazil, and starting only from the Port of Ilhéus – BA just to Lucas do Rio Verde – MT. Thus, it will take and will bring billions of tons of cargo, from our future deep offshore port of Ilhéus - BA to the giant and semi-deep port of the large Chinese nautical carrier Cosco in Chancay - Peru (or Bayovar - Peru).

 These 03 railway routes, added together in the new complete Transoceanic (FIOL + FICO + Transoceanic in the final part), are almost fundamental, since it is the only one that, in addition to already being about 39% under construction (FIOL + FICO), will pass through much flatter regions - a mix of plains and plateaus in the center of the country and surrounded by large mineral deposits, but also because it already has large crops of grains, food, bioenergy, etc., in addition to being our longest route to Peru, that is, the one most capable of benefiting our immense central interior of the country much more (the other proposals for a bioceanic railway, with all due respect, whether from the current Ports of Santos - SP, current Açu Port - RJ or future Presidente Kennedy Port - ES benefit the country much less, since they are shorter and much more expensive (100% still to be built), since they are expected to pass through much more heavily embanked areas and with much higher railway or even road construction costs (see below) than the route above, which, in fact, most of Brazil (plus Chinese engineers and investors - see above their claims and arguments about the “TEDA/China-Egypt Industrial Park” at the end of the Suez Canal) has already convinced itself that it is the cheapest route and much more realistic and less dreamy. On the other hand, several Chinese construction companies/investors such as “the Communications Construction Company - CCCC” are already interested in completing it only if it is this Transoceanic Railway/FIOL/FICO plus its Port of Ilhéus - BA, including its railway engineers who were now in April/2025 at FIOL/BAMIN-Port of Ilhéus researching and showing interest in the entire complete project); the same goes for CRCC (the China Railway Construction Corporation) and even CREC (the China Railway Engineering Corporation) who have also shown interest in building and financing it. Read more at: See more data at: https://veja.abril.com.br/economia/china-vai-rasgar-o-brasil-com-ferrovias-entenda-os-projetos-na-area/  .

 In addition, another great piece of news, also from early May 2025, is that our Minister of Transport announced that at least 3 more auctions for long-term railway concessions will be held between December 2025 and July 2026 (possible routes already well outlined/analyzed in my complete study and to be purchased by interested parties via my email address described at the end) on the New York Stock Exchange (not on our B3 Exchange, where, it seems, minimal participants have shown little interest in similar previous auctions), that is, on 3 future fundamental railways, all broad gauge and, therefore, highly developmental in Brazil and in which total investments of R$ 53.5 billion are expected. See at: https://valor.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2025/05/15/renan-filho-anuncia-3-primeiros-leiloes-de-ferrovias-com-investimento-de-r-535-bi.ghtml  .

 Another fundamental competitive factor of the Ports and their access railways - often pointed out by the main serious analysts and successful railway investors - refers to the low speed of our trains - 50% of the opinions raised -, a problem that is aggravated by the poor conditions of the existing network and by the invasions of the right-of-way of the old railways, most of which are still narrow gauge, by neighboring communities, which force the reduction of the speed of the trains to a miserable, difficult and expensive and world unbelievable of 5 km/h. According to ANTF, in adequate conditions, the trains, which today travel between 5 km to 20 km/h, could reach up to 80 km/h (that is, with low headway - see below -, including in convoys with GPS and in "double-stack" wagons = two floors of chipped and even refrigerated or frozen containers), if the tracks were properly revitalized and the problems of level crossings and invasions of the right-of-way were eliminated. In this item, the main objectives are to determine the further and more effectively the commercial coverage of such dependent/auxiliary Railway, the more points such Port also obtains, as long as it is up to 2,000 km and even in fairness with the shorter/less comprehensive internal ports of the South. The main objectives are to determine how much and how such future very deep and even semi-deep ports in Brazil – as long as they are demonstrably already accessible by rail (as) only in broad or mixed gauge – can manage to capture all the producible/industrializable/exportable items and to deliver/sell their importable or non-importable inputs (i.e., much more capable of rapidly and regionally developing such areas included in such well-defined perimeter), but only over a maximum distance of up to 2,000 km from such Port, even if such rail (as) have much longer routes or accesses. According to our studies and criteria, above 2,000 km it may be very expensive to access - even due to common stubbornness in Brazil - such a port under analysis and/or it may be much better to process and sell such itens regionally, even at lower prices, and/or direct them to other, closer ports, with everything occurring via other railways in any gauge and/or via other less suitable/less efficient modes, but with lower local costs.

 Everything will occur within the defined port-rail perimeter and, to be much more comprehensive, everything will be well drained/supplied and developed and all with a possible minimum rail headway, given that, for the realities of Brazil, the ideal rail speed considered in normal trains for passengers only - not TGVs - is 110 km to 130 km/hour, and with a minimum of 80 km/hour and a maximum of 110 km/hour in ore trains and other cargo trains (all to obtain minimum and fundamental headways - see below), being much shorter if already on broad gauge, always remembering that broad gauge in railways is already a recent and almost a worldwide rail-maritime requirement. In the old diagnosis from 2010 by IPEA Brasília (“Rail Freight Transportation in Brazil: Bottlenecks and Perspectives for Economic and Regional Development”) it was already observed “that the PAC prioritizes works in broad gauge, due to the better operational efficiency and the greater capacity that this gauge provides compared to narrow gauge. However, a large part of the existing network in Brazil is narrow gauge and some of its bottlenecks must also be resolved. One option is to readjust the narrow gauge network to broad gauge, with the implementation of a third rail, lateral to the existing ones, but this change is quite expensive. In addition, since the layout of narrow gauge railways is older, with more ramps and curves than current railway projects, the operational cost would continue to be high, even if it is in broad gauge. Another option is to implement a third rail on the broad gauge line, that is, a rail in the middle of the two existing ones, making up the narrow gauge. This implementation is less costly than the opposite configuration of implementing the third rail on a narrow gauge line, to then compose the broad gauge.

 In any case, the cost of implementing the third rail is high and is only viable for short distances, where the operational costs/maximum times/contamination/losses/costs of making the, still erroneous but widely used in Brazil, cargo transshipment would be greater than the recovery of the investment in the third rail - See: https://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/3767/1/Comunicados_n50_Transporte.pdf   

 This is easily proven by looking at the current situation of the old railways in Brazil, which reached 40,000 km of rolling stock in the post-war period and today have no more than 10,000 km, with little use and very precarious conditions.

 Thus, in the operational practice of such future railways – in addition to much higher speeds and maximum safety to transport the maximum volumes of minerals, bulk, industrial, fuels, etc., even in state-of-the-art “double deck” or “double stack” container cars and many types for different uses (already in use on the Southeast Railway Network of our modern MRS Logística Railway), worldwide, all of them also have to fight hard to achieve the ideal railway “headway” to compete well. By technical-economic definition, this is the time for a train to meet another coming in the opposite direction – on sections with parallel lines – and which are the great indicators of high and much greater business efficiency and transport solutions, etc. The best “headways” = shortest are in Japan and with only 5 minutes of meeting intervals on some TGV lines = the Shinkansen bullet train. However, in urban rail systems, average headway times can rise to up to 10 minutes, depending more on demand than on system efficiency. On long-distance trains, headway times can reach 30 minutes (in Brazil, there are lines of the former RFFSA, now VLI/FCA, where only 4 trains pass through 24 hours a day, with only 2 going up and 2 going down). On our second best railway currently – the Ferrovias Carajás - studies mention a headway of 131.8 minutes on a subsection with ore trains, but it is said that there are some railways arriving at the Port of Santos - SP with only 30 minutes of headway - but both with very low speeds, of only 23 km/hour (this being the average speed for the Port of Santos), which nullifies all possible competitiveness - compared to 8 to 14 minutes on our main international mineral/grain competitors, and 8 to 14 minutes on the São Paulo subway and on some Brazilian  urban trains (situations very different from ours in the analysis). In fact, the average speed of Brazilian railways has been the subject of analysis, with some lines presenting average speeds below 10 km/h, while others, such as Vitória-Minas, reach speeds of only up to 27.6 km/h, with the minimum ideal in Europe and China being 80 km/h.

 See much more data, projects and areas covered by the East-West Railway Corridor (FIOL EF 334 + FICO EF 354) at the link https://ppi.gov.br/projetos/corredor-ferroviário-Leste-Oeste/  .

 It is also worth reading the good and courageous article in the following link, which proves that our beloved VALE is already possible acting almost like a “rogue company” in this episode of the possible purchase/takeover of FIOL and its Port of Ilhéus – BA. There we also read that the ore already being produced at the BAMIN mine in Caetité – BA, the current owner of the project, is one of the best quality, most demanded internally and externally and with the lowest production in Brazil as says a important ore consultant. Since the episodes of deaths and destruction in Mariana and Brumadinho, VALE seems to have not learned anything and probably it only wants to create more business interests problems and maybe embarrassment for our country. See and prove it at: https://atarde.com.br/colunistas/armandoavena/vale-nao-quer-a-bamin-e-nem-o-corredor-ficofiol-1318627

 On the other hand, it is also absolutely correct to say that the cost of building a conventional railway is, on average, twice the cost of building a road (but its long-term rail maintenance cost is 50% to 75% lower than that of highways). The current cost of building a railway in Brazil - according to average data from public tenders and construction/buying companies - can currently range from R$ 8.0 million/km (= Us $ 1,5 million/km) to R$ 22.0 million/km (= Us $ 4,0 million/km), depending on the topography to be traversed and the technologies to be used, while the cost of a road can be significantly lower, generally from R$ 6.0 million/km (= Us $ 1,3 million/km) to R$ 30.0 million/km (= Us $ 5,8 million/km), depending on the location and standard. It is also important to note that the cost of building a railway can vary significantly depending on several factors, such as the topography of the terrain, the complexity of the work and the type of railway to be built. In Brazil, in general, railways - quite unlike highways - can be built in much cheaper and safer ways in flatter places, closer to the flat banks of medium and large rivers and with the use of a few tunnels. Additionally, since Brazil has about 14,000 watercourses running down from the plateau (up to 1,800 m above sea level) and towards the sea (there are 8,500 km of Atlantic ocean coastline), building and maintaining lateral/transverse highways is very, very expensive. On the other hand, including in the numbers above, Brazil has about 2,000 medium and large rivers, which greatly facilitates and reduces the cost of building strategic railways (especially if in the east-west direction, such as the future Transoceanic Railway from Ilhéus Port – BA to Peru Ports, with far fewer parallel and crossing watercourses) and even dams to generate a lot of electricity for such railways, as well as for irrigation and to contain the water.

 Thus, also with such rail high costs (especially if it is in some coastal regions to Pacific directions - very common in the states of our Southeast and South regions - and/or with some streams and big rivers to be crossed too) - although many ignorant people insist - only tourism, passenger transport, grain transport, some agricultural inputs, construction materials, etc., ALONE, will never make such railways viable anywhere in the world and, above all, their expensive and frequent fundamental maintenance (the same goes for the constant costs of the necessary dredging of their shallow ports ahead and through which most still embark). “Silting is the natural process of accumulation of sediments (sand, mud, etc.) at the bottom of rivers, canals and sea ports, reducing their depth and making it difficult for vessels to navigate. The main causes of silting in Brazilian ports include: 1) Deforestation and erosion: The removal of vegetation and soil erosion in riverside areas and river basins increase the amount of sediment that is transported to bodies of water and, consequently, to ports; 2) River dynamics: River currents and tides, which are responsible for transporting sediments, also contribute to silting; 3) Human activity: Dredging in ports, which aims to remove accumulated sediments, can also alter river dynamics and, in some cases, aggravate silting in other locations.”

 In the case of passenger transport, I think that it should be mandatory on all Brazilian railways and in at least two daytime schedules (one semi-express/stopping at all stations and another express/semi-direct, but stopping at 1/3 of them). I also think that every train should have special carriages for transporting the families of railway workers and miners involved, even as prizes/rewards/incentives. Our great example in Brazil are the EFVM railways – as Vitória-a-Minas Railway (I was raised, thankfully, in a small town next to one of the stations on the banks of the Rio Doce in MG State) and the Carajás Railway too, both of VALE, which provide exemplary transport services with extremely high social and egalitarian responsibilities and great promotion of regional developments since their inaugurations (incidentally, as is also done, obligatorily and exemplarily, in Alaska/USA and throughout Russia) and with everything occurring without any problems for their transport of minerals and other items, even though they are still on narrow gauge, as in the EFVM.

 Another huge problem, and even a constant one in many ports in the southeast and south of Brazil, is the huge, costly road traffic jams, lasting up to 7 days and involving more than 800 trucks, which are also highly polluting (both in Santos Port – SP, and in Paranaguá Port – PR and other ports in the southeast, south and even north during the peak harvest periods). At the beginning of May/2025, there was a huge line with 1,200 trucks waiting, and causing a lot of pollution, for 6 days to unload their grain loads at the river port of the Madeira River in Porto Velho – RO. All of this road traffic jams greatly increases transportation costs for exports, as well as wear and tear, and also reduces our productive competitiveness in artificial ways after the gate.

 Such major traffic jams above in Brazil, which are frequent in the ports above during the peak of the grain and other food harvests, unfortunately almost always result in long lines of ships waiting and paying high daily fines (demurrages), with all the delays added together leading to long waiting times and useless operations (often involving ships that are already outdated and as if they were already retired, without any demerits). At the peak of the harvest, according to authors, the port of Santos can have lines of around 80 to 100 ships waiting to dock, and this waiting line can have an average waiting time of around 20 to 23 days. All of this is (or should be) a GREAT DISGRACE FOR A COUNTRY THE SIZE OF BRAZIL and that demands a lot of real community patriotism (without fights and disputes) for its solutions, mainly, through high investments and international partnerships WITH SOME OUR SERIOUS BUSINESSMEN and in new, future and much faster, modern railways and only in broad gauge (above all, correcting the immense and many previous errors of our old, slow, narrow gauge railways etc., - but, still very profitable only for some powerful economic groups, without visions of the future and their shareholders, idem - plus many shallow ports, some even poorly located), including so as not to leave their people (of the investing/buying countries) until they go hungry and lack future biofuels and various minerals, also essential for their full development.

 In fact, Brazil has always benefited greatly from excellent climates, topography, gigantic size, vast oceans, and many, many natural resources, minerals and forests, honest people (lots and lots of cheap, efficient, intelligent, happy, participative young labor, and much easier to train and to evaluate) BUT IT DOES NOT KNOW HOW TO USE THEM PROPERLY FOR THE BENEFIT OF ITSELF, ITS PEOPLE AND HUMANITY AS A WHOLE AND IT EVEN FIGHTS AMONG ITSELF.

 That is why this minimum depth at the actual embarkation/disembarkation points of the ports PLUS their access in km and already in broad gauge railway PLUS their distances in km to the tip of the new Suez Canal/Gulf of Aden and already in the heart of all of Asia/Southeast Asia/Africa/Arab countries (not only China, in fact as China itself already insists in 04 countries neighboring Aden, where China already has processing ports and/or military bases - see the summary about the giant Chinese objectives of the “TEDA/“China-Egypt Industrial Park” at the tip of Suez) are the 03 most essential and future items to score/classify in this future strategic diagnosis, because ONLY IN THIS WAY will much better/more competitive access be allowed to produce/export/import and transport much more volumes and, thus, also load many more trains and ships, thus making the deposits, grains, food, industrial items, etc. much more viable. collected/offered, etc... In other words, with everything becoming viable quickly and for many years in a row and distributing future income/jobs/revenues/developments much better throughout the country. So, being able to reach the new Suez Canal and/or the new fast railways of Turkey/Gulf of Aden, even if by smaller ships (several types of Suezmax and Capesizes that are faster/much less polluting) and already for 150,000 to 200,000 tons, could be a great competitive advantage for future ports, that is, also exporting via smaller but much faster ships, since the world's socio-economic-environmental geography changes every day, after the much greater intensities of the China Factors, BRICs and, recently, the Trump Factor.

 Comparatively - as a business strategy for future locations/investments - the measured maritime distances (be careful with such data and not to confuse them with air distances, which are generally much more widely publicized to lie/mislead and/or with a lot of misleading advertising from ports and even from some companies located/interested there and, above all, by some so-called consultants who sell out) from our Port of Santos - SP to the Port of Shanghai - China is approximately 20,475 km, if via southern Africa, and 24,155 nautical km, if via the new Panama Canal. Comparing the maximum estimated sea distance from the Port of Bayovar/Piura – with the same port of Shanghai - China, it would be only 17,600 km, as you can see in the following link that from the Chilean Port of Antofagasta to Shanghai it is 18,677 km in real terms, but this Chilean port is approximately 1,070 km further on land (“on-shore”), that is, further inland, than the Port of Bayovar - Peru above, remembering that the Andean country forms a kind of wedge in South America.

 Also, regarding our other future modern and deep ports – even if not pre-selected here, as they still do not exist, even minimally – in RS, the construction of a new giant and private Port (PUT/TUP = Private Use Terminal) is planned, the so-called “Porto Meridional” in the Arroio do Sal City - RS, to be located on the northern coast and cost approximately R$ 6.0 billion, but with the start of construction scheduled for late, 2030. In SC, the same applies, the construction of another future private/cooperative TUP is planned in Itapoá (with 450 m of seafront, with 04 piers and a draft of 18.5 m) plus a second Port also in the São Francisco do Sul City - SC (this one with works scheduled to start in 2026).

 However, all these new Ports and PUT/TUP also depend heavily on their future rail access - provided that they are much faster, safer, more modern and have much lower travel and maintenance costs - but in which, almost always and even culturally - there are serious difficulties for these projects to take off quickly, both due to the rise of high real estate speculation with rural lands being overtaken, especially semi-urban ones in the interior - and due to the difficult regional topography involved, most of which is very embanked and difficult to bypass/tunnel, with both of the above situations making such railways much more expensive and delaying them.

 Also, in most cases, Brazilian port designers still refuse to understand that the global solution to deepen ports to reduce future maintenance costs, a very common situation in shallow and old ports in the South and Southeast (in the new “offshore” ports, which have almost eliminated future silting, all to accommodate increasingly larger ships at much cheaper freight rates) is the correct implementation of good “offshore” ports, that is, even island ports with up to 3.0 km of access bridges, as long as they are from the seashore to their actual shipping points. In Brazil, unfortunately, we still only have/will have 04 modern and deep “offshore” ports (current Pecém Port - CE; future Ilhéus/Aritaguá-Porto Sul Port - BA; current Açu Port - RJ and current Itaguaí/Ilha da Madeira an island offshore port - RJ). Another major difference is that such highly modern and much more efficient "off-shore" ports rarely require high costs for local dredging, a long-standing and highly damaging situation in most shallow ports in the southeast and south of the country. It is also important not to confuse the concepts of “off-shore” or “island” ports with “off-shore” naval operations (or STS = "Ship to Ship"), that is, those that allow transfers between ships on the high seas, as sometimes occurs in the Ports of Itaqui - MA and Tubarão - ES, both of which are ports operated on the coast. Large real “off-shore” ports are deeper and must have an access bridge and their loading/unloading terminals, or berths, located at the end of the port or on its sides.

 Most of the country's ports, even if deep, are on land, that is, "on-shore". So, as for comparison, in the Southeast, the current Ports of Itaguaí/Ilha da Madeira RJ ("off-shore" island Port) and Açu - RJ ("off-shore" Port) - both private - are good examples of how to properly design and implement such "off-shore"/island ports; how to attract investments/financing for them (thus, being much easier to attract/add, since with much lower risks, although with slower implementations) and, mainly, how to properly to implement, even quickly, such types of revolutionary ports that most of the world already adopts and/or demands for investment (as is already done much more in the ultra-modern, low-risk, low-maintenance and very fast railways - if, and when, in broad gauge - see below -, these almost a new world order and almost worldwide rail-maritime requirements). See in English at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Broad-gauge_railway .

 The best access for our future giant Transoceanic/FICO/FIOl Railwal (Chinese? or National? or PPP = Public-Private Partnership?) to the deep ports of northern Peru (much closer to eastern China – see above – than those in the center and near Lima) – although there are already many strong opposing lobbies and even paid reports against it in Brazil – has to be via the Port of Bayovar/Piura, getting there via a valley and with an existing highway in the so-called “Hope Canyon” – where the ancient Amazon River passed in the Triocene –, since this is already located in the lowest part of the northern Peruvian Andes, about 2,000 meters shallower than the southern areas of the Peruvian Andes, and Pucallpa, already in Peru, is only about 300 km from the city of Cruzeiro do Sul – AC and the entire “Envira Valley”, a very poor and well-developed region of the Northeast and West of Acre (in the so-called Rondon Quadrant, that is, already on Route 3) and according only to national interests. The Amazon River emerged millions of years ago, with estimates of around 9 million years. In the geological past, the river flowed from east to west, towards the Pacific Ocean (by the hope canyon above). Today, the river flows east to north into the Atlantic Ocean. See and verify at: https://ac24horas.com/2025/05/14/bittar-critica-jorge-viana-por-comemorar-ferrovia-que-nao-inclui-estrada-de-pucallpa/.

 On the other hand, other serious data also prove that our future accesses to China, via our FIOL + FICO + TRANSOCEANIC, goes from only Ilhéus - BA Port and already to Bayhovar Port in Peru, would be, INCREDIBLY, almost 2,875 km less (20,475 km - 17,600 km) closer, than from Santos Port to Shanghai Port, for example, via southern Africa - see above more introduction map picture (perhaps already half the time needed, since recently a semi-light vessel from the Cosco Navigation to its new port of Chancay/Lima - Peru took only 22 days on its way from China, compared to up to 32 days just to get from Shanghai to Santos via southern Africa and in faster container ships, that is, reducing the travel time by 10 days if it were via southern Africa, which allows for almost 3 additional very profitable trips every 2 months, depending on the flows, the currents and weights. See more details on page 14 of the Ministry of Planning's 2024 report at https://www.gov.br/planejamento/pt-br/assuntos/articulacao-institucional/rotas-de-integracao/relatorio-2024-rotas-de-integracao.pdf  .

 Furthermore, in future commercial practice, there will be no point in having access to all types of ships to embark quickly if there are still - or will be - serious difficulties in capturing minerals and goods to be transported, whether dry and/or refrigerated and/or containerized cargo and/or large volumes of minerals, but which do not arrive in sufficient volumes and/or quickly and much cheaper at their backports and yards/warehouses/silos, etc., even requiring costly cumulative storage and serious losses.

 Thus, one of the criteria recommended/used here to score well is to already have good access via broad gauge railways, even though there are still many loads that only reach them via narrow gauge railways and/or, worse, via the expensive and very polluting highways, especially in the old and also much shallower ports of the Southeast and South of country. In this case, as these are only conceptual and “yes/no” type answers, in order not to contaminate the research and the data results, we adopted – in a statistically correct way – the punctual evaluation mode of 00 (no, this without and until 2040); of 01 (more or less likely, but after 2035 until 2040) and of 02 (yes, already certain until 2040), multiplied by the average weight of 0.00 to 2.5, also totaling 05 maximum points to add, but remembering that not having future access to the fundamental items nearby - such as not yet having access via broad gauge railway and/or being shallow and with less than 18 m of real draft/deep at its real point of embarkation/unloading at high tide (average of the 13 main ports in the country in analyses/scores) and still being much further away from the tip of the Suez Canal/Gulf of Aden at the beginning of Inner Asia and Southeast Asia - greatly reduces and harms such Ports even in fairness with the other ports that already have them or will have them by 2040. Again, see the summary about the giant Chinese objectives of “TEDA/“China-Egypt Industrial Park” at the tip of Suez.

 As already described, the Construction Companies and their Investors prefer to build future railways - even if a little longer, such as the future Transoceanic/FICO/FIOL railway (already 39% under construction) and starting only from the Port of Ilhéus – BA, that pass through much flatter regions in a mix of plains and plateaus in the center of the country, such as this FIOL, also surrounded by many minerals and large grain, food, bioenergy crops, etc. – which greatly depend on such large volumes –, in addition to the fact that this route is our longest to Peru Ports, that is, capable of benefiting the central interior of the country much more. The other proposals for the Bioceanic Railway, with all due respect, whether starting from the ports of Santos Port - SP, Açu Port - RJ or future Presidente Kennedy Port - ES, benefit the country much less, as they are shorter and much more expensive (and with 100% still to be built) and, worse, they will pass through much more heavily embanked areas with very much high railway construction costs, or same road, much larger than giants - see above such comparative costs.

 In the case of the future modern, fast and low-cost railways required by our country, in addition to the approximately 3,500 km of the 04 new broad-gauge railways already under construction and which are quite fast (the sum of future FIOL plus future FICO plus Transnordestina new rail plus the future MT state railway too), Brazil already has approximately 3,000 km of future railways still in the design phase and/or in attempts to obtain much more external or internal investments and/or PPP partnerships and/or financing, especially in the South of the country. Obviously, they were not pre-selected here for joint analyses, especially because most of them are still only in the design phase, perhaps even speculative and, unfortunately, with very high midia exposures that are not monitored/policed/condemned and even weekly and, possibly, even paid for in the form of clearly misleading advertisements in the mainstream media, and even in the specialized media and, unfortunately, as is already becoming common in Brazil, except by, and for, large companies already in the sector and some truly patriotic and serious Consultants/Professors. It is clearly noted - that with the advent and intensive use/dependence of the internet, plus various completely free and/or poorly monitored websites, plus dubious and very active/slave-driving social networks, etc. - many have tried to pull off successive scams - perhaps even well covered by certain weak laws and encouraging regulations and/or perhaps even to open their share capital/debentures/IPO on the stock exchanges, all to attract investments from the unwary and/or from many ambitious people (recently, they were even called these by a certain Minister, as Paper Railways").

 In Brazil, the new broad gauge railways - quite clarifying why I insist so much on them, as they are already fundamental (even as points of comparison of planned/announced and, mainly, of their future real global railway/port competitiveness) - they are characterized by a wider/broad gauge of 1,600 mm (compared to standard gauge of 1,435 mm and with the narrow gauge of only 1,000 mm), as they offer advantages such as greater stability, greater load capacity and greater potential for reaching much faster speeds (even for TGVs = Bullet Train, in general, these with speeds of 250 km/hour to 400 km/hour, whereas, for the realities of Brazil, the ideal railway speed considered for normal trains - not TGVs - is 110 km to 130 km/hour and the minimum is 80 km/hour for trains carrying various loads.

 Although historically used in several countries, including Russia and India, and for specialized applications such as high-speed trains and heavy cargo transport, their much wider gauge (1,600 mm) can also present challenges on winding routes and higher construction costs.

C) CURRENT ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF WORLD BROAD GAUGE RAILWAYS -

 A) Advantages of Broad Gauge: 1) Stability: Wider rails provide better lateral stability, a factor especially important for high-speed trains and those carrying heavy loads; 2) Load Capacity: Broad gauge allows larger and heavier loads to be transported more efficiently; 3) Speeds: Some argue that broad gauge facilitates higher speeds and smoother ride comforts; 4) Passenger Capacity: Wider trains can be better accommodated, potentially increasing passenger capacity; 5) Logistical Benefits: In regions with difficult terrain and/or extreme climates, broad gauge can offer a much more stable infrastructure;

 B) Challenges of Broad Gauge: 1) Higher construction costs: Wider gauges require more material and can increase construction costs, especially on winding routes; 2) Interoperability: Different gauges can create challenges for international rail transport, requiring specialized equipment (a conflicting situation, already common and even shameful in Brazil where – of the original approximately 40,000 km of 60 years ago, today, we only have approximately 10,000 km of total railways still operating, all in narrow gauge and in poor operational conditions); 3) Historical context: The decision to use a broad gauge generally has historical, logistical and political reasons, making standardization difficult between different countries, even due to fears of invasions and wars (as occurred in an old outdated military vision in Brazil with intensive use of only metric gauge in the South, precisely due to fears widely proclaimed at the time of predicted invasions by today's and former good neighbors, MERCOSUR, considering a big military error because “in Argentina the railway gauge is mainly 1,676 mm (this named Indian gauge), being the second largest railway network in the world in this gauge, with approximately 19,967 km. In addition, there are railways with metric gauge (1,000 mm) and also some lines with standard gauge (1,435 mm)”.

D) WORLD/CHINA-BRAZIL-PERU – COMPETITIVENESS COMPARATED OF DEMANDS AND OFFERS AND SAFE INVESTIMENTS/HIGH PROFITS OF FUTURE PORTS/RAILWAYS/ROADS EVERYTHING FOR MUCH MORE PROFITS AND WEALTH FOR EACH COUNTRY: “ONE BRAZIL INSIDE EXAMPLE/EXERCISE OF CURRENT AND FUTURE REAL COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES COMPARED FOR BETTER SALES/PURCHASES (AND THUS, FOR GREATER GENERATIONS OF JOBS/INCOMES/DEVELOPMENTS, ETC.) IN THIS CASE, BY MUNICIPALITY/REGION THAT IS A LARGE BRAZILIAN PRODUCER, CURRENT AND FUTURE, OF GRAINS, MINERALS, TIMBER, BIOENERGIES, ETC., AND LOCATED IN CENTRAL BRAZIL” (Note: this is the most distant region of Brazil to transport its various items above to the ports – both for export and for the domestic market – and all, in this stress test, in 04 possible different directions and future rail-port routes in Brazil. In the current and future situations of many rapid sequential global changes (for better or for worse in each location), all municipalities in Brazil - whether they are producers or not - should immediately carry out (afterwards, every 3 years) such analytical tests of PROACTIVE COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE to discover, propose, and properly implement their projects and everything to obtain/manage/correct in time their real competitiveness, based more on competitions and global demands/offers correctly internalized, more on real current and future municipal data/conditions, more on possible business decisions and efforts, more on federal and state interests/help/support, idem, but, above all, on current and future support/needs/demands of their people, etc.).

In conclusion, and comparing in terms of current and future local/regional logistics strategies, one of the major questions regarding Brazil's future agricultural, forestry, and energy production is which will be the best and most profitable future route for rural producers to better transport/export their agr. more minerals more woody items.

In the end, everyone in Brazil intends to profit much more than they do currently (they only keep 8% to 15% of the final net profits on average in agribusiness and already assuming, alone, all the climate risks plus agricultural diseases plus the high risks of many accidents and all the personal/family costs plus the gigantic and continuous banking and asset risks, etc.) and also greatly reducing their dependence on trading companies and global multinationals, both buyers/processors (with this occurring much more in their countries of origin) plus our expert large suppliers of fertilizers, agrochemicals, machinery, etc.

So, we have now decided to compare and to simulate (and check 05 times beforehand, as there are already many incredible corporate and even consulting lies about this) the possible best destinations for our current and future grains, food, and bioenergy, etc., to be produced, only for example, in the excellent and large region of Vilhena (RO), located in the so-called Southern Cone of RO, an already highly grain-producing region. Thus, the most central-western region of the country and the furthest from Brazilian ports, with the main target being to reach, as profitably as possible, the ports of eastern China. It is certainly based on this future fast broad gauge’s railways more really deep/fast/cheap ports definitions that the real future competitiveness of production, storage, purchases/sales, exports, imports, input purchases, planting, cultivation, extractives, etc. will be shaped. from much of the interior of Brazil.

 So, Let's look at and analyze the four main possibilities of these items comings from The Vilhena City and Region, State of Rondônia, to the China Shanghai Port, along with their current competitive challenges and/or advantages, ranking them ONLY from shortest to longest, for comparative reasons that are purely geographical (not so much commercial):

1) As the first option - the shortest AND WITH ONLY 02 TRANSSHIPMENTS: TRUCK/TRAIN/SHIP for the production of the Vilhena Region - RO to reach in the future the super Port of Shanghai in China will be to travel a future total rail/naval route/route - SHORTEST (considering the final destination) - have ONLY 20.523 Km, via access and exports/imports through the new port of Chancay of Cosco Navigation in Peru (compared to 25,543 km of the third option/route below, the longest (but the most commercial, if by the very fast and even hourly Turkish/Chinese railways, at up to 250 km/hour of trains in the new “Silk Road”), via the Port of Ilhéus - BA plus the Suez Canal/Gulf of Aden; compared to 23,580 km of the third best option/route via the Port of Santos - SP plus a bypass of the Cape of Good Hope in southern Africa; and compared to just 23,296 km of the second best option/route, via the Madeira Waterway in Porto Velho - RO plus the Port of Santarém - PA plus the Panama Canal, the most used route today even if in smaller ships). This will occur in this first option, THE SHORTEST, departing in the FUTURE from the Region of Vilhena - RO by future fast rail route and all in broad gauge of the future Transoceanic railway; MORE maritime transport of large volumes (capesize ships for up to 200 thousand tons, almost double, compared to those through the Panama Canal) until to the same Port of Shanghai in China. In total, by the sum, it would be 646 km from Vilhena City - RO State to Lucas do Rio Verde City - MT State  (if local politicians fight hard and dare wisely, the future giant Transoceanic railway - which the Chinese Government has already authorized all studies more to finance by the BRICs this month - may NOT pass through Vilhena, but rather go straight up from Lucas do Rio Verde - MT to Porto Velho - RO, all this in a future much shorter route, with much less forests and fewer indigenous reserves - via Brasnorte - RO and Juína - RO); ANOTHER 2.646 km, predicted by technicians, from Lucas do Rio Verde - MT by railway entirely in broad gauge (future Transoceanic) to the deep "offshore" Port of Cosco Navigation Shipping in Chancay / Lima PERU; PLUS approximately 17,231 km and in a westerly and direct maritime direction to the Port of Shanghai in China, according to a specialized website more to the Cosco Shipping (but there are other data that cite 9,900 miles = 18,334 km and still others as being 10,620 nautical miles. See, for example, on page 14 of the OFFICIAL report of the Ministry of Planning in 2024, where it is mentioned that, according to a study by the National Observatory of Transportation and Logistics of the Planning and Logistics Company in 2021, the Bioceanic Route reduces by up to 5,478 km = 22.7%, the maritime distance to Shanghai in China, when compared to routes starting at the Port of Santos. This can represent up to 12 days less maritime transport. See: https://www.gov.br/planejamento/pt-br/assuntos/articulacao-institucional/rotas-de-integracao/relatorio-2024-rotas-de-integracao.pdf );

2) Today almost all of the current production of the Vilhena Region – RO is now transported - ALSO WITH ONLY TWO TRANSSHIPMENTS: TRUCK/FERRY/SHIP - by road until to the Madeira River near the Porto Velho Capital - RO, and then downriver by barge, generally to the Port of Santarém - PA State (north direction), where it is loaded onto vessels with smaller cargo capacities, at most neo-Panamax vessels for up to 150,000 tons, or up to 13,000 containers, the current ones capable of passing through the Panama Canal to China. This second short route—mostly private—as we will see/prove is one of the most widely used today, since, overall, this route—THE SECOND SHORTEST TO SHANGHAI BUT WITH MUCH SMALLER SHIPS—only reaches 23,296 km to China. In total, and overall, it is 705 km from Vilhena-RO by truck to the waterway terminal near Porto Velho - RO; ANOTHER 1,246 km of ferry convoys along the Madeira Waterway from Porto Velho Capital, Rondônia State, to the river port of Santarém City, Pará State, near Belém Capital, Pará; ANOTHER 5,400 km of waterway from the same port of Santarém, Pará, to the new Panama Canal (Colón City), still shallow and only suitable for smaller Panamax or Neo-Panamax vessels up to 150,000 tons; ANOTHER 15,945 km of waterway via the new Panama Canal to the Port of Shanghai in eastern China (west of Brazil and Panama). However, China—for various reasons—does not recommend such access via the Panama Canal, perhaps because it is more for small vessels and/or because the Panama Canal is already very prone to prolonged interruptions due to frequent droughts with severe drops in the water level of its crucial Lake Gatun—and, therefore, will invest heavily in our future Transoceanic Railway, originating from Ilhéus Port – Bahia State - Brazil. In recent years, Gatun Lake in Panama – without which the Canal would not be able to function – has dried up significantly, reducing its depth by up to 5 meters for a long 3 to 6 months/year (from December to May each year);

3) The third future option for the production of the Vilhena Region – RO State - ALSO WITH ONLY 02 TRANSSHIPMENTS TRUCK/TRAIN/SHIP, would be to travel a total future route - THE THIRD SHORTEST and with 23,564 km of rail/naval from Vilhena Region - RO, goes to the port of Santos - SP - with its contumacious contour through southern Africa - to the port of Shanghai in China (compared to ONLY/SHORTEST 20.523 km of the first route above, via Porto Velho plus the port of Chancay in Peru; and 23,296 km of the second route, the most used today and in smaller ships, via the Panama/Colón Canal). In total, this third option is by the future sum of 646 km of broad gauge railway from Vilhena - RO to Lucas do Rio Verde City - MT (replacing thousands of trucks/trailers = up to 530 per convoy - and preserving/emptying highways, etc., the environment, and many humans and animals lives); ANOTHER 730 km in the future from Lucas do Rio Verde - MT by the current Rumo railway until to Rondonópolis City – MT State (where the Rumo already operates as far as the Santos Harbor); ANOTHER 1,655 km of existing railway from Rondonópolis City MT to Santos - SP (all in partnership with the private Vicente Vuolo Railway of the Rumo Company and/or by simple right of way, paid); ANOTHER 20,533 km from Santos Port – and in much larger ships (capesizes for up to 200,000 t.) to the same port of Shanghai in China, passing through southern Africa. Note: In Brazil, unfortunately, our famous Port of Santos is already a very shallow port, only 14.5 m deep. It almost exclusively loads and unloads small vessels, with at least five years of technological lag compared to those operated in other ports worldwide. Shipments can take up to 17 days at a time, leading to huge queues of ships waiting, with everyone paying high daily demurrage fees. See my other recent articles, including a very well-described and well-analyzed article (each 01 of the 13 main Brazilian ports, with no protections, no interference, no lobbying, etc.);

4) The fourth and last future option – ALSO WITH ONLY 02 TRANSSHIPMENTS: TRUCK/TRAIN/SHIP – for the production of the Vilhena region – RO to reach the Port of Shanghai Port in China (AND AS THE FIRST POSSIBLE COMMERCIAL DECISION and with LOWER FINAL PRICES – HIGHER COSTS) will be to travel a total route/distance – of LONG 25,543 km by rail/ship, BUT BEING THE ROUTE THAT CAN CARRY THE MOST CARGOES OF DIFFERENT TYPES AND VOLUMES. As a 2nd POSSIBLE COMMERCIAL DECISION (with MUCH HIGHER FINAL PRICES, SINCE FOR OTHER EUROPEAN AND ASIAN INLAND/ARAB DESTINATIONS THAT REWARD BETTER - LOWER COSTS) it would have to travel - with 03 SUCKED TRANSSHIPMENTS: TRUCK/BRAZILIAN TRAIN/SHIP/CHINESE TRAIN - only total of 15,000 km from the Port of Peru, by this Ilhéus Port – BA State - Brazil -, to the very fast Chinese railways (operating at up to 250 km/hour and with a maximum headway of 120 minutes) to the semi-deep ports of Turkey (Mersin and/or Iskenderun; already deepening) and for sales prices of the items already much higher, than those to be sold in China itself (since the final European destinations and in central Asia are much closer and already pay much more), all in large Suezmax ships for up to 170,000 tons and/or smaller capesizes up to 200,000 tons, being, only in this case of the 2nd negotiation/commercial decision, via the future Port of Ilhéus, BA - Brazil, plus railways in the semi-deep ports of Turkey (already in greater semi depth), CLEARLY THE MOST PROFITABLE in the future. ALREADY with ONLY/SHORTEST    20.523 km, the first route would continue to be the SHORTEST and from Vilhena, RO, via Porto Velho plus from Cosco Navigation's Port of Chancay in Peru to China and in large ships; compared to the 23,296 km of the second route, the most used today and in smaller ships, via the current dry  Port of Panama/Colón Canal in small ships at most in post-Panamax; and 23,564 km, via the Port of Santos and southern Africa, also in small post-Panamax ships and some Suezmax). In this fourth route/complete route to Shanghai - China (not just to the Turkish railways) everything would occur starting - in reverse, that is, from West to East, from the region of Vilhena Region - RO via the Future Transoceanic fast railway and all in broad gauge plus FICO + FIOL (as an initial part of the future Transoceanic total and already 39.0% under construction in total up to Lucas do Rio Verde, that is, with 61.0% of it still to be leased and built). In total, and by the future sum, there will be 646 km of railway from Vilhena Region - RO to Lucas do Rio Verde City - MT state (replacing thousands of trucks/trailers per day (= up to 530 per convoy) and preserving/emptying highways etc., plus the environment and saving many human and animal lives); PLUS approximately 2,700 km from Lucas do Rio Verde City - MT via the FICO and FIOL railways (already 39% under construction) and eastward to the deep offshore port of Ilhéus-Aritaguá/Porto Sul - BA; PLUS 12,997 of maritime km – published by a specialized website -, in medium to large Suezmax vessels for up to 170,000 t. and/or smaller capesize vessels for up to 200,000 t., from the future deep and offshore port of Ilhéus - BA to the end of the Suez Canal (already in the Gulf of Aden); PLUS about 9,400 km eastward from the Gulf of Aden, via Singapore, to the Port of Shanghai in China (most of which are maritime distances published by specialized websites and never by misleading aeronautical distances in a straight line and/or just by Google Maps, ditto and/or by road distances in km, as if they were in nautical/nautical miles and, even worse, as if they were in normal road miles, that is, with data already used intentionally false and/or even for future excuses and/or by satellites in a straight line, all of which are even widely used by laymen, even facilitators and deceivers, even university/professors). On the other hand, if the trading companies and rural producers of the Vilhena Region - Brazil - decide to sell/deliver their grains, food and bioenergy, by the same initial route in Ilhéus - BA, but later, already delivering - for even better prices - on the future Chinese railways of the new Silk Road already in the ports of Mersin and/or Iskenderun on the east coast of Turkey, the total route/distance is reduced by about 10,500 km to just about 15,000 km total comes from the Port of Chancay in Peru until chinese-turkish future fast rails. These Turkish ports will be the future ultra-fast Chinese railways of the new Silk Road (under construction since 2013, capable of transporting up to 250 km per hour and with uphill and/or downhill loads) and from there to the entire interior of Asia, the Arab countries, and all of Southern Europe (via two tunnels) and Northern Europe, plus Iran, Russia, Ukraine, Poland, northern Germany, etc.). This trade route also connects Brazil.

Explaining better - as an excellent strategic future even better not only for Ilhéus, but also for Itaqui, Espadarte, Pecém, Suape Brazil ocean Ports, and for several ports in Brazil above the mineral Tubarão Port - ES (and which the various and multiple national companies of many types, sizes, and objectives need to include, urgently, in their strategic planning for much more operational and much more profitable futures), such Chinese railways in Asian Turkey will be connected by railway branches not only with Europe to the West, via Turkey + Albania + Italy (future giant maritime tunnels of Marmaray with 13.6 km under the Bosphorus in Istanbul, already ready, plus the Vlora-Otranto tunnel, connecting Albania to Italy with 11.2 km armored for trains at 250 km/h, and with construction scheduled to begin in 2028). The same would also occur with other branches of the ultra-fast Chinese railways to Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Poland, and other countries above (almost at the top) and to the West, almost reaching Germany, and then to all of Asia, below, and to the East/Central/Northeast. Achieving rapid and strategic rail penetration via this new Silk Road, behind/at the back of European and/or Asian countries—via ports in Brazil and Turkey—could be a major future competitive advantage for maximizing profitability for Brazilian companies, cooperatives, and rural and mineral producers, that is, for agribusiness, food, bioenergy, and even strategic/rare minerals. Everything, then, can be done strategically to ultimately directly reach small and medium-sized processors, wholesalers, and retailers in the interior of all these countries—especially European ones—at much lower prices for European consumers but with very higher prices for Brazilian producers. We all know that Brazilian exports, especially by agribusinesses, rarely manage to reach such end customers, especially in Europe (no matter how much they want and also try to buy directly from us), because in the ports of Europe (especially Rotterdam, Hamburg, Antwerp, Brussels, etc.) there are a series of trading companies/warehousing companies/transporters that are concentrators/domineers/very demanding/very supportive of Governments and Agencies, etc., perhaps even cartelized, and that, practically, prevent/bar our direct local sales and/or such direct purchases by end customers in the interior and/or surroundings of large capital cities.

 E) THE BRAZILIAN PORT RANKING FORECAST/EXPECTED FOR 2035-2040 (not only in a current and existing vision of the port/retroport/warehouses/silos/cranes/conveyors/railways/highways/accesses etc. but also already incorporating new works and machines/future transports systems foreseen and even fundamental for its full success, more for its real operational competitiveness and even its international continuity and references) -

 As already well described, even late and repeatedly above, we ranked the 13 main future ports in Brazil, in total points and unit points, achieved by the sum of the 08 fundamentals items pre-selected by me to achieve, and the full strategic study/diagnosis of each Port - with a large number of its data plus its details and its current and future strategic and competitive information and future score details - can be obtained by email: [email protected] .

 In conclusion, from the most competitive Ports foreseen - and with the best expected/projected/justified/elected performances in 2035-2040 -, to the even less competitive ones predicted, we have the following scores and predictions added together (I hope they can be changed/improved in the future) and in descending order and all - in a current vision of a new world order in force in May/2025, but reclassifiable up to each year if of interest -, based on the full fulfillment, or not, of the 08 requirements/new modern, future and fundamental challenges pre-selecgted by me, follows the punctual classification of each port analyzed. That is, the more points, It is much more competitive, more profitable, more regional development  (analyze your geographic coordinates well) and, better, with lower risks to invest/finance/install local factories, etc., all as ranking below:

 1. The Ilhéus-Aritaguá/future South Port – BA (14º41’02.02”S//39º03.18.29”W) WITH – WELL DETERMINED/WELL ANALYZED – 39.0 TOTAL POINTS ADDED;

 2. The Ponta da Madeira/Itaqui Port – MA (02º33’34.18”S/44º22.02.27”W) WITH – WELL DETERMINED/WELL ANALYZED – 38.0 TOTAL POINTS ADDED;

 3. The Santos Port – SP (24º00’34.57”S//46º14.19.20”W) WITH – WELL DETERMINED/WELL ANALYZED – 35.0 TOTAL POINTS ADDED;

 4. The Tubarão/Praia Mole Port – ES (20º18’43.29”S//40º13.41.51”W) WITH – WELL DETERMINED/WELL ANALYZED – 34.50 TOTAL POINTS ADDED;

 5.       The Sudeste/Itaguaí-Ilha da Madeira Port – RJ (22º55’42.03”S//43º48.40.78”W) WITH – WELL DETERMINED/WELL ANALYZED – 33.0 TOTAL POINTS ADDED;

 6.       The Açu in São Joao da Barra/Campos Port – RJ (21º50’13.01”S//40º58.58.76”W) WITH – WELL DETERMINED/WELL ANALYZED – 32.50 TOTAL POINTS ADDED;

 7.       The PECÉM Port – CE (03º33’12.41”S//38º48.00.03”W), WITH WELL DETERMINED/WELL ANALYZED – 32.0 TOTAL POINTS ADDED;

 8. The Rio Grande Port – RS (32º06’28.73”S//52º05.40.27”W) WITH – WELL DETERMINED/WELL ANALYZED – 31.50 TOTAL POINTS ADDED;

 9. The SUAPE/Santo Agostinho Port – PE (08º24’18.07”S//34º57.12.11”W) WITH – WELL DETERMINED/WELL ANALYZED – 31.0 TOTAL POINTS ADDED;

 10. The Vila do Conde/Barcarena-Espadarte Port - PA (01º33’50.68” S//48º43.43.91”W) WITH – WELL DETERMINED/WELL ANALYZED – 30.50 TOTAL POINTS ADDED;

 11. The São Francisco do Sul Port – SC (26º14’19.95” S//48º38.33.71”W) WITH – WELL DETERMINED/WELL ANALYZED – 25.0 TOTAL POINTS ADDED;

 12. The Paranaguá Port – PR (25º30’45.97” S//48º29.39.18”W) WITH – WELL DETERMINED/WELL ANALYZED – 24.0 TOTAL POINTS ADDED;

 13. The Itajaí/Navegantes Port – SC (26º54’09.52”S//48º39.19.00”W) WITH – WELL DETERMINED/WELL ANALYZED - 20.0 TOTAL POINTS ADDED.

 E) DETAILS, REASONS AND EXPECTED SCORES FOR 2035-2040 FOR EACH OF THE THIRTEEN PORTS UNDER ANALYSIS, ACCORDING TO THE CURRENT GLOBAL SITUATION (FACTORS: TRUMP; CHINA/NEW SILK ROAD/TEDA/CHINA-EGYPT INDUSTRIAL PARK ETC; BRICS AND OTHERS) IN ADDITION TO THEIR ALREADY HIGH COMPETITIVE DEMANDS FOR PRODUCTION/INDUSTRIALIZATION, IN ADDITION TO COLLECTIONS/DELIVERIES BY VERY FAST MODES, WITHOUT RISKS AND WITH LOWER COSTS - AND ACCORDING TO THE SWOT AND PORTER ANALYSES OF EACH PORT, BUT COMPARING WITH THE WHOLE –

 The complete/detailed/ exclusive/SCORED port-by-port plus its dependent/auxiliary railways etc.. only can be acquired by email: [email protected] . It is a legal and only personal diagnosis, not official, nor public, nor any external influences -

 END

 Brasília (DF) and Porto Seguro (BA) on July 12, 2025

Thank you for your readings, analyses and sharing.

“THE VIVAMELHOR AMBIENTAL A BRAZIL THINK TANK”

(a modern and faster socioenvironmentalist/green & sustainable Energies Brazilian “think tank). For further details, please contact me only by email at [email protected]