Why do Chinese want Bahia? (Türkiye Silk Rail Route nearby?)
Why do the Chinese want Bahia? Would be because Ilhéus/Camaçari future hubs already with possible 26 China/Arab/Brazil companies to buy internal/import/process/export many items by Silk Route very fast rail in Turkey, only 10,000 km East from Ilhéus?
- SUMMARY -
The Summary of this highly guiding, decision-making and negotiation-based article will be presented in the form of 8 strategic and many clear questions (as if they were short subtitles) to be answered and well analyzed in the same article, AND BY ITS READERS, namely:
1) Why do the Chinese want Bahia State? It would be due the future hubs in Ilhéus Port and of the actual Camaçari Port and both with many partnerships to process/import/supply South America, to the West, and/or to export much cheaper items through the future Silk Road fast rail in Turkey, only 10,000 km East from Ilhéus and, from there, to export for many East countries, mainly for whole Europe/Eurasia and all interior of Asia (not only to China)?
2) Why the giant Cosco Navigation and the China/Brazil governments and Chinese Investors are already betting on the giant FIOL-FICO-Transoceanic Railway coming from the current port of Chancay-Peru to our future deep offshore South Port in Ilhéus – BA? All everything would be to transform it into a giant International Logistics partnership Hub, with at least 26 future Chinese/Arab/Europe with Brazilian companies, described/analyzed below already interested/installed and processing in the ports and railway borders?
3) Would this also be because the highly competitive Ilhéus/Camacari ports hubs are only 10.000 km far from Turkey silk route ports and this rail route with much more fast train (by 250 km/hour) and shorter time intervals (possible future 02 trains headway only each 130 minutes)?
4) Why did giant companies like the Chinese automaker and manufacturer BYD suddenly decide to set up a giant vehicle factory (especially for future electric vehicles) exactly in Bahia (initially more for assembling CKD/kits imported from China, but complying with the mandatory Brazilian nationalization index) plus setting up a similar giant factory in Turkey plus greatly expanding its fleet of fast and medium/large ships for transporting ready-made and/or CKD vehicles?
5) I ask the same question about the recent purchase of the giant Acelen Oil refinery by the giant Arab group Mubadala in Camaçari City, where it also intends to set up a large biorefinery to produce of rare and fundamental SAF (Sustainable Aviation Fuel) plus of the new Be8 BeVant maritime biodiesel (which has a final price of only 50% of the current HVO maritime biodiesel), being most of them made with macauba oil, a coconut palm tree native and undemanding of the Northeast region and that produces 7 times more oil/hectare/year than soybeans and for 20 to 50 years and is also a great restorer of degraded pastures?
6) Also I ask Why do at least other 26 large and medium-sized Chinese/Arab/others companies (listed below) already are prospecting and even investing in many different businesses in Bahia State and regions next to the future transoceanic/FICO/FIOL fast railway comes from Peru, especially minerals and agribusiness (this all in broad gauge rail and already 39% under construction) and not in regions/cities with old ports, most of which are very shallow and already overloaded and expensive and, worse, very surrounded by high mountains and many descendants rivers in the Southeast region (ES, RJ, SP) and South region of the country (PR, SC, RS)?
7) In the opposite direction, I ask too: Why do the Chinese/Arabs/others companies and government entities above still not talk much about investing in the regions/cities of the Northeast and North, near and above Bahia, and already with deep ports, well located before the entrance to the Mediterranean and countries of southern and central Europe (ports of PE, CE, MA, PA), but still without railways only in broad gauge and still with little access to large, heavy and constant volumes (guaranteed for 30 years to 50 years) of grains, food, bioenergy’s and few different types of minerals?
8) On the very negative side and still to be overcome in the future, I ask why doesn't the Federal Government better publicize or not encourage the 518 new mineral opportunities throughout the Northeast Region (In 2020, only in Northeast, they already totaled 673 only in initial and/or still superficial Small Worker/Personal Mining Permit phase type SWMP/PLG), especially in Bahia, and very close to Transoceanic/FIOL-FICO future rail and the Port of Ilhéus - BA. Why do our giant the VALE Minig INC and other national mining companies talk little or nothing about them? (See the 2020 report that there were already 286 type SWMP/PLG in Bahia alone, that is, still only in superficial/outcrop prospecting and, therefore, not yet subject to business with mineral rights to use and/or export. Thus, the SWMP is a regime/type that is classified independently of previous research work, according to criteria established by the NMA/ANM - National Mineral Agency). See more in Portuguese at: https://www.inthemine.com.br/site/perfil-da-mineracao-no-nordeste . Also, since 2010, data from the Bahian Mineral Research Company (CBPM) has already indicated the existence of 350 little mining companies operating in more than 100 municipalities in Bahia State, already generating more than 8,000 jobs. There is no shortage of examples: researching, mining and processing few iron ore in Caetité city; and vanadium (Maracás city); including bentonite (Vitória da Conquista city); phosphate (Campo Alegre de Lourdes city); gold (Jacobina and Santa Luz cities) and nickel (Itagibá city). Only in the regions of Caetité - BA and Brumado - BA (with FIOL rail Section 01 already ready and 537 km from Caetité - BA to the future Port of Ilhéus-BA, this 75% ready) the existence of 15 current deposits of iron/manganese/barite/gold/asbestos/topaz/amethyst/chalcedony plus a large reserve of atomic uranium etc. plus its already large regional production of grains, food, bioenergy plus large wind farms with current high very high generation (the largest in the country)?
2) ARTICLE -
Everything indicates that—based on various previous diagnoses, options, and even clearly strategic and future-oriented actions (four main reasons that I describe and analyze in detail below in the article)—China has indeed chosen Bahia as its preferred region in Brazil, all of which has greatly increased after Trump's recent protectionist measures and tariffs against China, Brazil, and others. In Bahia, the main Chinese targets (already followed by Arab, Eurasian, and European groups) are the locations near the future deep-sea offshore port of Ilhéus/Porto Sul and Camaçari Port too, also because these ports are full stop of Brazil west fast rail route comes from the future west Transoceanic Railway. Recently, China declared that it intends to invest an additional around of Us $ 5.0 billion (= R$ 27,0 billion) in Brazil by 2032, in sectors such as mobility, mining, and technology.
Thus, the optimal future strategic combination of the West-East Integration Railway (FIOL) with the future Porto Sul – Ilhéus City more Camacari current Port, both in southern Bahia State, could place the entire region, including its access routes, at the center of one of the most ambitious logistics strategies in international trade. Furthermore, the presence of the giant Chinese Cosco Shipping, one of the world's largest shipping companies, reinforces China's interest in transforming Ilhéus into a strategic hub for the flow of Brazilian products and its connection to global markets. With this high future potential, Ilhéus could become one of Brazil's largest logistics and industrial hubs, with economic impacts comparable to the urban and tourism transformations already seen in cities like very rich/tourist The Balneary Camboriú city - SC south State). The generation of direct and indirect jobs, combined with real estate appreciation and the increase in tourism, plus the many businesses and jobs, is highlighted by analysts as a potentially unprecedented opportunity for the region. Such Chinese, Arab and other choices for Bahia, especially Ilhéus, foresee a regional industrial hub and a direct route to Europe, Asia and the East via high-speed railways accessible from Turkey to the south and north of Europe more of Eurasia, to the left of our access to the Mediterranean and, in reverse and to the right, to the Gulf of Aden and all of inland Asia as far as China, all via the new and now deep Suez Canal.
In total, I have already managed to catalog - and which I describe and analyze below in the article -, a minimum initial of 26 large and medium-sized companies - mainly Chinese, Arab and others from Asia and Europe - already investing or prospecting such areas on the coast and in the interior of Bahia, plus - in west direction too up for Peru ports - in areas neighboring the new Transoceanic Railway/FIOL/FICO in GO, MT, RO and AC (all center-west and center-north Brazil States), that is, from many agribusiness sectors, old mining in large volumes and new mining of rare/atomic/silica earths already concentrated plus old and new truly sustainable biofuels; the same goes for electric vehicles and their many components, etc.).
So, everything indicates that—based on various previous diagnoses, options, and even clearly strategic and future-oriented actions (four main reasons I describe and analyze below)—China has indeed already chosen Bahia as its preferred region in Brazil for prospecting by the Chinese government, as, for me, as almost well for recommending investments and partnerships in Brazil. This has greatly increased after Trump's recent protectionist measures and tariffs against China, Brazil, and others. In Bahia, the main Chinese targets (already followed by Arab, Eurasian, and European groups) are the locations near the future deep offshore port of Ilhéus/Porto Sul (much 20-23 mt real deep) and Camaçari current Port (only 12 mt real deep), plus regions close to the entire route of the future Transoceanic Railway (this one with a total of 4,900 km to the ports of Peru and already 39.0% under construction in its initial section from FIOL in Bahia, plus FICO in Goiás and to Lucas do Rio Verde in Mato Grosso).
With this high future potential, if the Ilhéus future EPZ - “Exporting Processing Zone (see rules, notes and facts in English presentation at https://www.gov.br/mdic/pt-br/images/SE-CZPEa_-a_Apresentaa_oa_SECOM-MRE.pdf) is truly implemented quickly, the region and the city could become one of Brazil's largest logistics and industrial hubs, with economic impacts comparable to the urban and tourism transformations as well described above. The generation of direct and indirect jobs, combined with real estate appreciation and the increase in tourism, as well as numerous businesses and jobs, is highlighted by analysts as a potentially unprecedented opportunity for the region.
Expected Brazilian cargoes include: a) Grains and food (soybeans, corn, coffee, etc.); b) Fresh and processed fruits; c) Beef, pork, poultry, fish, and other animal meats; d) Dairy products; e) Ethanol and biofuels, produced by the neighboring Acelen/Mubadala biorefinery in Mataripe, including the new SAF (Sustainable Aviation Fuel) derived from macauba and various biodiesels, plus the new Be8 BeVant biodiesel, which has a final price of only 50% of the current HVO, the latter already better known as green diesel – see in Portuguese at https://www.vrum.com.br/notícias/biocombustível-motor-diesel/); f) Many old mineral volumes, new rare/atomic earths, and industrialized metals (there are already 12 well-identified mineral types on the future Transoceanic route); g) Chemicals and fertilizers, importable and/or exportable, etc. Furthermore, the future giant route may include the transportation of inputs from Peru and much cheaper fertilizers destined for all Brazilian agricultural regions, including Acre and other regions throughout the North and Northeast.
In total, I have already managed to catalog - and which I describe and analyze below in the article -, a initial and minimum of 26 large and medium-sized companies below analyzed - mainly Chinese, Arab and others from Asia and Europe - already investing in or prospecting such areas on the coast and inland, in Bahia, plus in areas neighboring the new Transoceanic Railway/FIOL/FICO in GO, MT, RO and AC, that is, from many agribusiness sectors, old mining in large volumes and new mining of rare/atomic/silica already concentrated (in Bahia alone there are 286 deposits/mines of 12 different minerals, old and new, still in the initial form of PLG in at least 17 municipalities near FIOL and still little, or not at all, properly prospected and since 2020); more of old and new truly sustainable biofuels; the same goes for electric vehicles and their many components, etc.).
Recently, in July 2025, China announced its decision to propose a study group, in partnership with the Brazilian government (which was quickly accepted), to identify ways to make viable not only the future offshore port of Ilhéus, but also the second and largest part of the future transoceanic railway (with 61% still to be leased, invested, and implemented) from the port of Ilhéus city, Bahia State, crossing the Brazil entire Central-West region in west direction to the port of Chancay/Callao-Lima of Cosco Navigation in Peru (in which it invested Us$ 3.4 billion in its construction). This act surprised everyone in Brazil and even in South America and the governmental and, above all, corporate food, mineral and rail/shipping world. This occurred even though Cosco demanded full access to its new Port of Chancay, which it itself stated would only be viable in the east pacific direction and much closer to the Changay Port in China (the largest port in the world and only 17,231 nautical km far from Chancay, according to Cosco), but all by fast rail (only broad gauge) bringing fast and a little cheaper many grains, food, bioenergies and minerals from Brazil.
However, such access from Brazil to Chancay, via Pucallpa/Cusco cities in Peru, is 1,550 km longer (Peru has a descending triangular wedge shape) and will require 30 very expensive tunnels under the Andes (Cusco region) and which will also pass through Andean areas at an altitude of 4,600 m. It may even be that the same Cosco - in a strategic, complete and highly much more profitable way - may want to be the builder and even owner of the new deep offshore port of Ilhéus – BA. Everything could be built by the giant Chinese construction company - the CRCC “China Railway Group” - which is already now starting the Salvador-Itaparica bridge - does the same in the final stretch of the Transoceanic Railway (this 69% still to be completed from Lucas do Rio Verde - MT to Chancay in Peru. This future giant railway will pass through much more comprehensive/diversified Brazil agricultural and mineral areas, also much flatter and with few rivers - and thus with much lower railway implementation costs - in the hearts of grains, food, bioenergy and new strategic mining areas in the center/north/northeast of Brazil). In the end, the question still remains as to why our old giant VALE Mining Inc never wanted to take over Bayovar Peru mineral port closer giant deposits of agricultural phosphate essential for Brazilian agriculture? All could be done by VALE in its super deep and ready-made port of Bayovar/Piura in Peru, which is about 890 km near to China Ports than Chancay port – because Bayovar is at the top of the Peru triangle shape just a little above and only about 1,250 km away from Cruzeiro do Sul City - AC State Brazil only - 09o O than Bayovar (via Jaen more Tarapoto/or Tarapolo cities in North Peru, almost on the border with Ecuador, on a route designed 15 years ago by the IIRSA Program and which hardly requires tunnels and the maximum height to be exceeded is 2,450 m in Andes too (I have a film of a tourist traveling on a great highway from Jaen to Piura). For better spatial orientation of the reader, I inform that the Bayovar Port - Peru is located at 05o49’23.68” S and 81o01’58.42” O; Jaen City Peru is at 05o43’00.34” S and 78o46’49.58” O; Tarapoto City – Peru is at 06o29’22.86” S and 76o21’48.59” O and, finally, Cruzeiro do Sul – City – AC State - Brazil is at 07o37’39.48” S and 72o39’49.19” O.
Furthermore, from the Bayovar Port/Piura to Cruzeiro do Sul City are only 950 km “directly” estimated - by avion -, but are only 1,250 km estimated “indirectly” if transposing the Andes at only 2,450 m high (with few tunnels) closer at Jaen City and after by Tarapoto City - passing through many forests, indigenous tribes and large unexplored mineral areas (gold, iron, manganese, rare earths, etc.) and almost in a straight line - until Cruzeiro do Sul City - Brazil. Comparatively, from the same Cruzeiro do Sul City, Brazil, until the Port of Chancay, Peru – indirectly and passing through Pucallpa, Peru Central, and then way down through Cusco to skirt the Andes, but still up to 4,600 m high – a long and very expensive/difficult rail with 1,550 km (870 km from Cruzeiro do Sul down until Cusco + 680 km from Cusco going up until Chancay) is expected and also rail will have to pass by extensive and very expensive 30 new tunnels.
So, in my humble opinion, and in a strategic-negotiation complement, I managed to reduce to 2, the grouped main reasons for such possible Chinese the Bahia/Brazil choices – highly strategic and much more future-oriented (but already with high Brazilian knowledge and well-founded) and other countries for investing in Bahia States more also in other Brazil States towards Peru.
So, let's look at my 2 main grouped reasons, clearly outlined and pointed out for this:
1) To reduce costs and greatly expand the business of its strategic new Silk Road in Turkey (towards Southern and Northern Europe - escaping the trading companies more of the trillionaire families and of owners and they cartels at the ports and of European retailers - plus Eurasia, plus most of the Arab countries, plus all of Inner Asia (not just to China anymore) the ultimate Chinese plan is to be able to access its future fast railways in Turkey. Those rails are only in broad gauge, still rare in Brazil, and already operating at 250 km per hour (and with a predicted future maximum headway of 130 minutes = maximum time for a train to meet another coming in the opposite direction) all mainly in the semi-deep ports of Turkey (rising to the right of Brazil and after in direct lines from the Strait of Gibraltar at the mouth of the Mediterranean - especially to Mersin and Iskenderun Ports - just only 10,000 km from our future Port of Ilhéus - BA) and/or also to the Egypt/Suez Canal (to the right after Gibraltar). It's also worth remembering that China already has three partnerships in processing and industrialization zones and its military/naval bases in that region of the so-called Gulf of Aden/Djibouti, the largest being TEDA - the Tianjin Suez Canal Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone for Economic and Technological Development, also known as the "China-Egypt Industrial Park" (this agreement is little known or analyzed commercially/strategically by Brazilian businesspeople). This "TEDA" industrial park is also a project of China's "Belt and Road Initiative," which aims to develop economic and trade partnerships with countries along the ancient "Silk Road" route. Meanwhile, the current Suez Canal is for much faster medium-sized vessels, such as “SuezMax” fast vessels for 150,000 tons and even "Capesizes" with up to 220,000 tons and/or 18,000 containers (China seems that doesn’t want the slow and dangerous ore/oil vessels or others for 450,000 tons carrying these weights. Current, they are no longer well accepted in their ports - even require S2S "Ship-to-Ship" transshipments—some of which are made its S2S operations only the distant high seas and/or in distant ports in neighboring countries). In Brazil, the country government more Chinese companies are tending to establish minimal, and even maximum, value-added and even industrialization-related industries in areas near the ports of Ilhéus City and Camaçari City, all to quickly and cheaply access the aforementioned ultimate goals of the new Silk Road in Turkey. A strong indication of this future is the recent arrival of the giant electric vehicle EV factory BYD near Salvador capital of the Bahia State. Interestingly, BYD is also completing another giant EV factory just in Turkey too, in addition to investing heavily recently in the transportation of CKD and even finished vehicles on its own giant ships;
2 ) Three other possible main reasons because the Chinese chose the future Port of Ilhéus - and its already broad-gauge FIOL railway and other locations in Bahia – are to access a long, productive, complete, and multiple/diversified route comes from and/or to Peru (better supplying many countries internally; expanding imports from China and Peru; reducing all costs and, mainly, processing and exporting much more, etc., along the ports and along the tracks, etc.). It seems that for various reasons, they did not prefer the locations of the old ports in the South (such as the current Tubarão Port - ES, Açu Port - RJ and Sudeste/Itaguaí Port - RJ, plus the future Presidente Kennedy - ES and the oldest and shallowest Santos/Paranaguá/Itajaí south ports), being, perhaps, for these main reasons:
a) The old ports in the South are not very extensive (except Santos the largest in South America) and all with few berths/piers that can actually be moored and/or are very shallow (there are ports only 12.0 m deep; Santos has only 14,0 m deep) and, together, and as majority even deep ports in the Southeast, they are poorly located (for many previous mistakes in their locations and constructions, as there were much more to import light items not to export heavy items), that is, many surrounded by high mountains and with many rivers to be crossed in possible future rail board gauge construction works (Brazil have about 14,000 waterways running down the mountains to the beaches and/or goes from west and center of country to north/northeast directions). Currently, most of these ports – even according to many complaints and even reports from their own users (see my recent articles about this) – only receive small and outdated ships (at least 5 years of technological lag). Worse, these ports are already overloaded (taking up to 17 days to load/unload as in Santos and Paranaguá ports); with queues of ships of up to 7 days of waiting and paying high daily fines ("demurrages") and with many ships even giving up; moreover, with immense traffic jams/giant queues of trucks at the ports/nearby highways and/or they are already much more dedicated to imports;
b) Building railways in the fundamental broad gauge - still with “0” km ready in these old bioceanic rail proposals (remembering that the transoceanic railway from Ilhéus to Peru is already 39% under construction) - and those proposed even reaching the ports of Peru would be much more expensive, time-consuming and not very strategic (especially if to add local value/industrialize and/or to export and/or to supply the domestic market near all the railways and others in the capitals) even if starting in Santos - a huge port, but shallow and already the most overloaded in the country – going by current an very operational broad gauge rail to Rondonópolis/Lucas do Rio Verde - MT;
c) These Southern and Southeastern biooceanic propose railways to Peru would pass through few mineral areas, as well few major grain, food, and bioenergy producers in the center of the country, and thus would achieve little, if any, low benefiting/development of the Brazilian interior. By other hand, this is all already guaranteed in the future transoceanic railway project from Peru to the port in Ilhéus that providing for large and constant and direct exports "in natura" or even adding value and/or industrialization at the ports, both to China – via Suez – and to the countries targeted by China on the new Silk Road accessible through Turkey. In reality, for me, all of this is what the Chinese/Arabs/Others and their companies maybe already know/expect will occur via the future Port of Ilhéus and is already occurring at the current ports of Camaçari and Salvador. This situation also tends to occur, unfortunately, in the large Brazil ports of the Northeast/North and above Ilhéus, such as SUAPE - PE, PECÉM - CE, Itaqui - MA and Vila do Conde/Espadarte - PA, that is, even in the future in up to 20 years, they will still only have - compared to Ilhéus - few volumes of minerals, even if diversified; the same goes for grains, food, bioenergies, well-collectible/well-distributed sustainable energies, electric vehicles, etc. and these will be items that need much more processing to serve the internal regional markets - already very demanding and even scarce - and not the external ones as the Chinese want and, for this reason, invest/will invest).
Concluding, what what are the motives, reasons and bets and why are the following 26, initial, MEDIUM to LARGE Chinese or Arab or other Asian/European companies in old and/or new/strategic/rare earth mining PLUS agribusiness PLUS bioenergies and new sustainable fuels PLUS wind energies PLUS electric vehicles and their many components, etc., already prospecting, even intensively, new businesses in Bahia State and/or that arrive/will arrive at the future port of Ilhéus/FIOL from Peru, plus from our states of AC, RO, MT, GO and BA and their neighboring states? Note: note that such companies already contradict everything that the, perhaps, short-sighted and lazy current management of our giant VALE Mining Inc, plus the pension funds that own them, etc. they state about the current and future non-competitiveness of such mines, agribusiness, vehicles, etc., to have local added value close to Ilhéus - BA and to be imported/exported via the future FIOL railway plus its future Porto Sul/Aritaguá (see more data in Portuguese in 2024 at https://valor.globo.com/brazilchinameeting/noticia/2024/01/10/empresas-chinesas-que-ja-anunciaram-investimentos-no-brasil-buscam-aprofundar-cooperacao-sembarreira.ghtml ):
1) “The Cosco Navigation” from the Port of Chancay in Peru and which, everything indicates, for me, also wants to build and to operate, strategically, the future port of Ilhéus/Aritaguá at the end of the new FIOL railway (as part of the future bioceanic rail, all in broad gauges for very fast and heavy train, with more than 4,900 km to the Port of Chancay, already with 39% under construction combined with the current FIOL West-East Railway + FICO Central-West Railway, coming from Ilhéus - BA to Lucas do Rio Verde - MT, in Lucas, our future FICO railway (already 45% under construction) will connect with the future Transoceanic railway to Peru, that is, adding 61% still to be built, but in almost flat locations, with few rivers and, after, crossing the Andes near Cusco;
2) The CRCC “China Railway Group” - a giant Chinese construction company mainly of the infrastructure sector and which, at 75 years old, has already become one of the strongest groups in China, and is responsible for important railway and civil construction projects in ports and airports in several regions and which has already begun construction of the Salvador-Itaparica future bridge. In Brazil, it may be that CRCC - in partnership with Cosco Navigation or even with our VALE plus the Federal Government/BNDES and JICA from Japan –, for me, they will be future interested/joined in the construction of the future South Port of Ilhéus/Aritaguá and, mainly, to complete and to manage the final stretch of the future transoceanic railway and approximately 1,650 km from Lucas do Rio Verde City - MT State to the port of Chancay of Cosco in central Peru (passing through up to 30 tunnels but up to 4,600 m high) or, who knows, to the mineral-phosphate port of Bayovar in Peru and also in partner proper of VALE (if its current managers/technicians lower their balls well... and/or cure their current myopia and lack of vision of the future) also in northern Peru (1,250 km closer to Cruzeiro do Sul - AC State and without the need for tunnels, since it is located next to a well-operational Peruvian highway up to 2,450 m high and already existing with good traffic from Jaen to Piura, being much closer to the entire northern interior of Acre State, remembering that Peru has an inverted cone and triangular shape);
3) The BYD Vehicles, which purchased and took over the old Ford factory near Salvador Capital, Bahia State, is expected to begin assembling and selling vehicles in August 2025. The new BYD factory is yet to be fully built, but the company's goal is ambitious. The Chinese automaker aims to transform Salvador and Bahia into Brazil's Silicon Valley, a nod to the region home to cutting-edge technology companies in California, USA. Note: The same BYD is also completing another giant electric vehicle factory right on the other side of the Mediterranean Sea, that is, in the semi-deep ports of Turkey (with full access to the future Silk Road), those being the main targets of our large and future maritime shipments (coming from Peru and passing through 5 giant agricultural/mineral states of the so-called Center-North of the Brazil), as they are located only 10,000 km from our future Port of Ilhéus City and the current Port of Camaçari City). However, deviating significantly from the text and my proposal for international analysis and debate, I must now apologize to readers and analysts from many countries (who I already know are very serious, demanding, and not ill-intentioned) for taking the time and space here to describe and thoroughly analyze/criticize. Some Brazilian people (maybe some poorly located and already losing external competitiveness in our rich, but still very ambitious, Southeast region of the country, are once again acting against the still poor, but much more strategic for the country, Northeast and North regions)—ill-intentioned, already uninformed, and misinforming the world—still claim that China does not want to set up final factories in Brazil, such as for vehicles of any type, but only to bring CKD here for assembly, even with the air in tires being Chinese (although the arrival of BYD is already good evidence against such arguments) because China needs to combat its internal unemployment. However, the current, average unemployment level in China is the lowest in the last 6 years (being 5.5% now in June/2025 – with an average rate of 4.78% from 2002 to 2025 compared to the record of 6.2% in February/2020 – at this current level practically equivalent to the unemployment of 5.8% in Brazil in the first quarter of 2025, according to the IBGE. As in many other countries, including Brazil, the biggest challenge in China is the high unemployment rate of 21.3% among young people aged 16 to 24 years, which was recorded in June 2023, but has fallen to 14.5% in June 2025. According to the Chinese government, youth unemployment is due to the still tepid demand for jobs and the current severe housing crisis. They also allege difficulties in creating jobs for young people, given domestic policies to maximize research, development, and the use of revolutionary technologies such as robotics. It also remains to be seen how much of this unemployment among young Chinese is real, whether due to a complete lack of interest in working, or to the extremely high demands and choices of the current so-called Generation "Z" (or "Zoomers" or "Centennials"). It is said that in China there are 150 million young people from Generation "Z" who also do not accept the working hours required by companies, nor do they want to meet targets, nor be monitored/supervised, nor do they accept accelerated work rhythms, as they claim that they get very tired. Thus, many “Z” young faces extreme difficulties finding lesser/worse jobs that they desire/demand and that pay the highest possible wages, as most consider themselves far superior to today's adults, and everyone loves to indulge, even though, to do so, they might even save on less food, less drinks, and all for a new, trendy cell phone. This also occurs in most countries today, including Brazil. Thus, China tries to expand its consumption and exports as much as possible, and, as in most countries, it is robots, not people, who assemble CKD vehicles in China. This is a fact that China itself has encouraged to absorb its technologies of all kinds, especially automation, robotics, and information technology. Thus, the Chinese government—in an attempt to reduce youth unemployment—will certainly not reduce multi-sectoral robotics manufacturing. What China really needs from Brazil—hence the choice of the Bahia Sul-Ilhéus port and its Fiol railway, for me, is a point of production and aggregation of food and mineral value already in Brazil—is much more food to better feed its people, plus so that its transporters and various retailers can contract much more domestically; PLUS much more inputs, bioenergies (our unbeatable ethanol and sugarcane and corn (DDGS), various biodiesels, aeronautical SAF from Macauba coconut tree, new clean maritime biodiesel, etc.) and even some special minerals (China also has a lot of minerals, but they are much more difficult to extract/transport), even if in sufficient volumes for many years of supply from Brazil (if possible, 30 to 50 years). Also, for me, even when adding minimal value or already industrializing locally on the ports of Brazil or Turkey, Egypt, Djibouti, other Arab countries neighboring the Gulf of Aden, etc. (thus generating internal jobs in these locations), Chinese companies would be greatly boosting their production of fundamental foreign currency plus much greater use of their very fast Silk Road railways in Turkey, Iran, and neighboring countries, which would also allow them to bring to the countries of southern and northern Europe, plus Eurasia, plus the interior of all of Asia more for the interior of all Arabs countries; all for much more products already manufactured in China and/or Brazil (regions of Ilhéus and/or Salvador), Turkey and others above, thus consolidating with their brands and products gigantic markets, current even many far from the main Chinese ports (and/or with few more markets to open/explore internally and in China itself);
4) Giant Arab refinery The ACELEN/Mubadala in Mataripe City - BA state and near from Salvador Capital, where the same group is already setting up a new biorefinery to produce Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF), initially from soybean/animal fat biodiesel and then, above all, from rustic, adapted and undemanding "macauba coconut tree" new palm oil (see my articles about it), which the company itself will plant in partnerships (agroforestry development projects as well and even to progressively replace only semi-evergreen and high-cost eucalyptus) with farmers from northern MG and the entire region of Minas Gerais, Goiás, Pernambuco and Bahia, all this to recover the maximum amount of degraded pastures and to produce - in a dense and/or integrated manner with other crops – and after to refine up to 7 times more Macauba oil per hectare/year than Soybeans and this in a perennial manner and for 20 to 50 years;
5) The BAMIN Iron Ore Mining (Mina Pedra de Ferro) near Brumado City, Bahia State, a Kazakhstani company currently heavily indebted and lacking resources, but already the current owner both of The Ilhéus port Project more of the FIOL Railway sections 01 and 02, which them broad gauge tracks are built about 75% of, practically alone and financed by the Government. However, the current directors and technicians of the funds that own Vale strongly abhor/reject partnerships with – all in a very short-sighted manner, or perhaps even disregarding the strategic and social interests of the entire country (not just its shareholders and/or directors), and lacking any intelligence for the future or strategic planning. Seriously – perhaps even without firm control by the Federal Government and following the same previous mistakes of the privatization of ELETROBRAS (giant Brazilian company and major generator, buyer and distributor of most of the country's electricity) – privatized at the wrong time when much cheaper and more reliable energy was needed – and PETROBRAS' exit from the regulatory/already very profitable fuel and LPG retail markets. On the other hand, perhaps more than proving VALE's successive errors, an internal report prepared in 11/2024 by the National Land Transportation Agency (ANTT) concluded that VLI, Vale's railway concessionaire since 1996, concentrated 90.0% of its operations in just 2,341 km of them railway's total 7,094 km and that the number of regular customers has been decreasing each year precisely due to an absolute lack of maintenance/new investments to increase the competitiveness of such railway sections with neighboring highways (perhaps due to successive errors on its part and never on the part of customers, as only it attributes this, since everyone knows that a good train on well-maintained tracks replaces up to 400 trucks loaded with 60-70 tons each, that is, there is no way to even compare such competitiveness between such modes if, and when, there is real interest). The remaining sections of the VLI include the entire very old rail network in Bahia, the entire network in Rio de Janeiro, and some sections in Minas Gerais, São Paulo, and Goiás. The remaining 4,753 km that are not of interest to VLI are said to be inadequately or non-existent in maintenance. Thus, the current shortsighted Vale, despite the major and costly errors/disasters in its Brumadinho city mine and Mariana city mine too, and also in the Fundão city dam in Espírito Santo State (owned by the old Samarco Mining, in a partnership between VALE and BHP), claims—to the four corners of the world—that it is merely a mining company and never a major transportation company (that is, lacking an international competitive vision for a new world that is not at all concentrated or solely focused on a single business (an old idea that has long been surpassed by major global companies, the best example being Coca-Cola worldwide, which already has 400 different brands/labels worldwide, with various flavors and associates). Thus, everything indicates that this may even be a management, or even, possible, only more corporate, vision that is highly distorted, shortsighted, and already very closed to other revenue streams and future fundamental/competitive changes, even if they are in the energy, socio-environmental, and global transportation sectors, and completely different from the largest mining companies in Australia, Asia, and even Canada. It even seems that our Vale only wants to see one mineral in the world, with eternal demand (iron). For example, in this case, if on the one hand, Vale describes BAMIN's current total iron reserves as minimal and, therefore, hardly exploitable in the long term, as Vale demands. On the other hand, some very experienced geologists, fully knowledgeable about the entire region, state that there are many other iron deposits—of medium and/or good quality—known/proven/explored or yet to be revealed, throughout the neighboring region, as they are still under confidential prospecting, for example, in the neighboring municipality of Salinas, Minas Gerais (current our Lithium Valley too). In that municipality, it is same VALE Mining more than the Votorantim, CSN, MIBA, SAM and other groups already have several mineral rights - highly confidential/almost hidden - of iron ores and even rare minerals such as lithium and many rare earths (there are already about 10 foreign mining companies with large concentrated lithium projects in operation in that region, coming from the largest mines in Brazil in Araçuaí City – MG State, neighboring Salinas – MG State; both current in our Lithium Valley). From Araçuaí - MG, the current Brazilian capital of lithium, plus its neighbor Salinas - MG (see above and with several giant mines of about 05 different types of metals still, duly, hidden) to the tracks of the FIOL Railway (already 75% ready by the BAMIN from Brumado to near the port of Ilhéus) are, respectively, only 430 km and 284 km still by road (certainly until also for a future short and highly strategic future new branch railway), today all traveling safely at 50 km to 60 km/hour; that is, only 06 to 09 maximum hours of double trucks with up to 70 t each of "spodumene" ore already partially concentrated. In this entire mineral region of MG state plus Bahia state, it is already reported that there are up to 12 strategic minerals, including rare/atomic earths, and in about 30 municipalities neighboring FIOL rail (also near of the southeast of TO - where there are gigantic mines of various types of iron - giant and extensive (already considered the largest current reserves in the world - see item below) - from Palmas Capital - TO State to Paranã City - TO State, plus some areas of the current the São Bernardo Mining, that is, almost next to the future FIOL section 03 (from Barreiras City (high grain/food region too) - BA State to Mara Rosa City – GO State (high grain/food region too) the final section and where it joins with FICO rail, about 45% already built, very quickly and by the same Vale Miner Inc, from there to Lucas do Rio Verde City -MT State; one very high grain/food/bioenergy’s region – the largest in Brazil). These future mining municipalities in Minas Gerais are located more in northeastern Minas Gerais region and in the famous Jequitinhonha very poor giant valley (the poorest in Brazil), meaning they are all nearby, poor, and have abundant mineral resources. In the case of the future of BAMIN, FIOL, and its associated port of Ilhéus, Vale Miner Inc recently stated that it even has some interest in buying, as long as it is cheap, as it has little useful ore. This is despite a consortium with the mining company the Cedro Participations (Cedro Participações) more with the BNDESPar (Federal promotion/investment Bank), and even the participation/financing offered to take over the mine, railway, and port construction by the JBIC - Japan Bank for International Cooperation (a long-standing and very serious financier of Brazil and Vale Miner itself), which has already expressed interest in this project. This came as a surprise even to Vale Miner Inc., a company with which JBIC has maintained a cooperative relationship dating back almost half a century. There are other companies that have or have had projects in common with Vale, such as Mitsui & Co, Nippon Steel Corporation and Mitsubishi Corporation, but full financing of the FIOL rail/BAMIN mines/Ilhéus South off-shore deep Port complex through the JBIC would be the most likely;
6) The São Bernardo Mineral Resources – With future giant iron mines still under prospecting/confirmation and being released in the southeast of TO State (more in the municipality of Paranã – TO; Latitude: 12º,38’,04.56” S and longitude 47º,50’.21.09” W; and which is only 130 km away – and up the Tocantins waterway by big barks – to the future new project in Section 3 of the FIOL in Campos Belos City - GO (Latitude: 13º,02’,28.17” S and longitude 46º,46’.12.33” W) already on the border with BA (before, in the previous project, the FIOL railroad passed near from the iron mines in Paranã City until reaching Figueirópolis City - both in TO State). At the moment, data from Mineratins (Tocantins State Mineral Research Company) estimates a giant mineral area on the triple border of the famous MATOPIBA (one of the largest grain producers in the country, and now even with 2nd crop corn for ethanol + DDGS too) and with successive, neighboring and many iron deposits and with 135 km in length and 40 km in width in the most surrounding place, more on the banks of the Tocantins River, totaling a total area of 6 thousand km², mainly with iron ores of various qualities, and certainly to be transported easily and even quickly also through the Port of Ilhéus - BA;
7) The Serra Alta/São Bernardo Mining a giant future iron and gold mines of in Serra do Carmo – TO (Latitude: 10º,54’,14.26” S and longitude 47º,57’.48.87” W) near from Palmas Capital - TO State going to the Ponte Alta City - TO (Latitude: 10º,44’,21.55” S and longitude 47º,32’.45.73” W). The giant volume estimated by Mineratins (Tocantins State Mineral Research Company) is approximately 159 billion tons of ore in the deposit (perhaps the largest in the world) and which begins in the territory of Palmas - TO (State Capital) and extends through several municipalities of TO to the southeast, with the majority also being echoed by the future port of Ilhéus - BA (the FIOL railway is near from this mines) and all this almost without our Vale Iron Ore Company knowing and/or being interested in such future Ilhéus Port and special regional socioeconomic development projects and/or participating even minimally, all due to an absolute lack of long-term vision and/or perhaps even of judgment of its directors and its proprietary funds, these always confident and obedient;
8) The Santa Fé Magnesite future Mining n the Brumado City and in Livramento de Nossa Senhora, both Bahia State, more in regions adjacent to the existing FIOL Railway (Section 02), which is also awaiting completion of the Port, with the FIOL already passing through its deposits. Santa Fé is developing a mineral exploration program—primarily for magnesite iron—in accordance with international standards, covering an area of approximately 6,000 hectares and already holding 16 mineral rights;
9) The "Brazil Iron Mining Company” has requested permission to build a new railway branch line and a private railway terminal, starting on the FIOL rail tracks. The project, to be developed entirely with private capital, will provide a more efficient and sustainable transportation of iron ore produced in Piatã City, Bahia State, in the Chapada Diamantina region. 120 km of its own railway will be built, also connecting to the FIOL junction in Brumado City, Bahia. The company currently transports its production by truck from the municipality of Piatã to the shipyard to Maragogipe City processors, Bahia. This involves approximately 1,000 trips of 450 km each, transporting 44,000 tons of ore, a distance traveled that would be enough to circle the Earth 11 times. Brazil Iron has a 1.7-billion-ton iron ore project in Bahia, recently renamed the Green Iron Project;
10) The Magnesita's megaproject (RHI) in Brumado City, Bahia State, covers 171.96 hectares of talc and magnesite mining area. RHI Magnesita emerged from the 2016-2017 merger of the Brazilian company Magnesita SA more the Austrian company RHI. Currently, RHI Magnesita is a global leader in refractory products. In Brazil, it operates in several states, including the unit located in Brumado, Bahia (inside FIOL rail), where deposits of magnesium-rich minerals (magnesite) are mined for the production of sinter, used as a raw material for the refractory industry. Known as the mining capital, Brumado's economy is based on mining, particularly magnesite and talc, and on commerce. The industry boasts major mining companies such as RHI Magnesita. Magnesita is almost entirely used to obtain the following products: Magnesium sinter; Electrofused magnesia; Caustic magnesia; Metallic magnesium and other magnesium compounds;
11) Uranium mines of the Nuclear Industries of Brazil (INB) in the municipalities of Caetité and Lagoa Real, both at Bahia State, next to the completed rail FIOL Trecho 02, were restarted in 2020 after being halted due to allegations of radioactive contamination and depletion of deposits. Mining activities at the Caetité Uranium Concentration Unit were halted in 2015, following the depletion of the Cachoeira Mine. The area produced 3,750 tons between 2000 to 2015. With the cessation of operations at Cachoeira mine, it was decided to license a new area, the Engenho Mine. In March 2025, INB signed an agreement with Russia to process uranium from Bahia, which provides for the temporary export of up to 275,000 kg/year of uranium concentrate for processing abroad;
12) The Honbridge Holdings/SAM, which has been developing an iron ore project (block 8 Project) in northern Minas Gerais since 2010, will receive Us$ 2.1 billion in investments. Four municipalities in Minas Gerais State (Grão Mogol, Padre Carvalho, Fruta de Leite, and Josenópolis, all very close to the rail FIOL in Brumado City, Bahia) will benefit from the complex, which could generate more than 6,000 jobs. Annual production capacity is estimated at 27.5 million tons of iron pellet feed and iron ore in grains with a diameter of less than 1 mm and a 66.5% iron content, a product with significant international demand;
13) The SAM Brasil Sul Americana of Metals is in the process of installing an ultra-pure (99% purity) industrial solar silica processing plant in the municipality of Belmonte – BA, very close to FIOL rail up to Ilhéus;
14) Another 13 Chinese companies are already prospecting to establish their factories or to processing plants in Bahia and (even in the future in other Brazil states), most of which are rare and atomic metal miners (according to the CBPM Agency - Bahian State Mineral Research Company) or suppliers of parts, glass, and vehicle tires or wind energy: a) Tianqi – Lithium Processor and Exporter; b) Lithium – Lithium Processor and Exporter; c) Ganfeng Lithium - As in the previous one; d) Zijin Mining Group – Rare earth processor and exporter; e) Goldwind – World leader in the production of wind turbines; f) Simona Blade – Large manufacturer of wind blades; g) Windey Energy – Also operating with wind turbines and green hydrogen; h) Sinomac – Manufacturer of metal and plastic vehicle structures; i) Minth – As in the previous one; j) ACG – Manufacturer of vehicle glass; k) XBRI - Part of the Chinese company Sunset Tires and will set up a factory on 100 hectares to produce 70 million tires/year; l) LingLong - Another tire manufacturer and already manufacturing for BYD, starting with investments around of Us $ 0.2 billion = R$ 1,0 billion in Brazil; m) Sailun Tire - Also manufacturing for BYD, and intending to invest around of Us $ 0.4 billion = R$ 2,0 billion.
END
This detailed legal diagnosis is neither official nor public—it is personal and without any external influences—but competitive and exclusive. It can only be purchased in full (15 pages) by email: [email protected].
Brasília (DF) and Porto Seguro (BA) on August 22, 2025
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"THE VIVAMELHOR AMBIENTAL A BRAZIL THINK TANK" (a modern and faster socio-environmentalist/green & sustainable energies Brazilian think tank).
